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           Introduction 
 Two monumental events shocked the world in the last decade of the twentieth 
century.  On December 26, 1991, President of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev declared 
the end of the Soviet Union and with it the Cold War.  The world cheered as forty-five years 
of east-vs.-west propaganda, strategic maneuvering and the threat of nuclear apocalypse were 
over.  The United States and NATO stood the victors heralding the triumph of democracy 
over communism.  The United States stood at the helm of a new world, one believed to be 
free of fear and needless conflict. 
 A devastating civil war began in Rwanda in 1991.  The small African country spent 
the past thirty years developing as a nation with a diverse past torn by decades of political 
and ethnic strife.  The civil war widened the divide between the Hutu and Tutsi and laid the 
groundwork for the second most deadly genocide of the century.   
 At the time of the genocide, most people did not understand the connection between 
the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the murder of nearly one million Rwandans in 1994.  
America’s triumph over the Soviets left it in a position where the world would call on it for 
economic, political and military support.  This position carried with it a heavy burden that 
American presidents George H.W. Bush and William Jefferson Clinton found hard to carry.  
These presidents determined that the United States needed to reassess American military 
intervention policy.  American policy makers believed the United States needed to limit its 
involvement in United Nations peacekeeping missions and military interventions.  Being 
more selective about the interventions, the United States supported would protect American 
military personnel and allow the United States greater resources for protecting its interests.  
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 Limiting American intervention meant that the president and the principle policy 
makers did not rate every crisis a priority.  States that ranked among America’s interests 
during the Cold War maintained priority in the aftermath.  This left all other states at the 
mercy of the changing priorities and policy dictates of the presidency.  When the political 
and ethnic conflict in Rwanda escalated to the point of genocide in April 1994, President 
Clinton decided not to intervene.   
 Scholars, policy makers and reporters have speculated why President Clinton refused 
to send a military operation to stop the killing, or to support the United Nations Mission to 
Rwanda in expanding its mandate to include protecting refugees.  The answers range from 
academic policy analysis to conspiracy theories about American imperialist aims for sub-
Saharan Africa.  Answering this question has fascinated me since I first learned about the 
Rwandan genocide.  To this end, I have decided to conduct my own investigation into the 
course of events surrounding the genocide and the evolution of American intervention policy 
throughout the 1990s. 
 This thesis has two goals.  The first is to answer why the United States, under the 
direction of President Clinton and National Security Advisor Anthony Lake, failed to offer 
military intervention.  I will do this by analyzing the relationship between the United States 
and Rwanda prior to the genocide, America’s failed intervention in Somalia, the evolution of 
American intervention policy, and the pressure to act from the American people, Congress 
and the international community on President Clinton. 
 The second purpose of this paper is to understand the evolution of American-
Rwandan relations after the genocide.  By analyzing American prevention policy and the 
increasing interactions between the American private sector, American government, the 
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Rwandan government and the Rwandan private sector, I will explain how and why America 
drew Rwanda closer politically, economically and militarily.  Understanding how and why 
the United States changed its interaction with Rwanda provides a clear lens through which 
American intervention policy has changed since the fallout of Somalia and Rwanda. 
 In order to understand the change in intervention policy and American interactions 
with Rwanda, it is important to know Rwanda’s history.  By understanding Rwanda’s 
history, we can identify the causes of the 1994 genocide and form an understanding why the 
Clinton administration believed the genocide was another phase in a long running civil and 
ethnic war that would likely never end.  The roots of the Rwandan genocide lie in its long 
history of European misunderstandings and the manipulation of ethnic identities.  Decades of 
colonial rule turned fluid ethnic identities into formalized requirements for access to higher 
education, better jobs and political control.  As the government of Rwanda changed through 
the granting of statehood, the 1959 Hutu Revolution and the 1991 civil war, the ethnic 
identities became the dividing lines for an explosion of ethnic violence that left nearly one 
million Rwandan’s dead, several million as refugees and shocked the Clinton administration 
into a rapid change in American intervention policy. 
 The first chapter of my work will focus on Rwanda’s path to statehood.  I will 
examine the early ethnic divisions between Hutu, Tutsi and Twa.  From there I will 
demonstrate how German and Belgian colonization started the process of ethnic stratification 
that eventually resulted in the 1994 genocide.  Following Rwanda’s decolonization in1961, I 
will examine the political and cultural changes instituted by the Hutu Revolution and the 
1991 civil war. 
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 Chapter 2 is dedicated to the peace process, which culminated in the Arusha Accords.  
I will highlight the American role in the finalization and implementation of the Arusha 
Accords and their ultimate failure.  Chapter 3 will comprise the genocide and the 
international failure to intervene.  Throughout the chapter, I will examine America’s limited 
involvement in Rwanda through the United Nations and more specifically the Security 
Council. 
 Chapters 4 and 5 will house the brunt of my arguments.  I will argue in chapter four 
that the United States’ resistance to intervention in Rwanda was the result of a process of 
policy changes started under President Ronald Reagan, which blended with a unique and 
defeatist perception of African civil wars.  The conclusion will focus on the United States’ 
new commitment to conflict prevention and interaction between the American private sector 
and the Rwandan government.  I will argue that the United States has taken a direct approach 
to dealing with African conflicts by promoting regional stability through country 
development.  I argue that President George W. Bush facilitated bonds between the 
American private sector and the Rwandan government to help the former assist the later in 
building a strong economy and promote stability. 
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   Chapter One  
From tribal alliances to statehood and civil war 
Rwanda took its first step onto the world stage during the European scramble for 
Africa at the end of the nineteenth century.  At this point in history, colonial holdings served 
as both a source of cheap labor and natural resources as well as a place to absorb excess 
production of the colonizing power.  After Kaiser Wilhelm II removed the “Iron Chancellor,” 
Otto von Bismarck, Germany was racing to secure colonial holdings so that it would have 
comparable status and power to other European nations.  Kaiser Wilhelm II argued that the 
German people needed “‘ein Platz an der Sonne’ (a place under the sun)”.1  Africa was one 
of the last places in the world where European countries could add to existing colonial 
holdings.  The unforgiving terrain and highly dispersed population made conquest difficult 
leaving inner Africa untouched by colonial hands until the late nineteenth century.2  As such, 
European colonial powers rushed to claim control of African territory resulting in the Berlin 
West African Conference, held from 15 November 1884 to 26 February 1885, which divided 
African territory among the top European powers of the nineteenth century.3 
 Germany, in its search for colonies and drive to build a colonial empire of its own, 
took control of Rwanda and Burundi [and such other places as German East Africa of which 
Rwanda and Burundi were a part, German West Africa, and German Southwest Africa].  The 
                                                          
1
 Daniela Kroslak, The French Betrayal of Rwanda, p. 19. 
2
 Jeffery Herbst, States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control, chapter two p. 33-
136.  Hebrst discusses the issues of territorial and population control in detail throughout this chapter of his 
book.  He explains that pre-colonial rulers focused on controlling populations rather than the landscape because 
people could simply escape into the vast expanses of African territory.  European states traditionally relied on 
controlling territory because  there were far fewer places for populations to flee to.  This presented a problem 
for countries like Britain who decided the cost of controlling the land and people outweighed the economic 
gains.  For countries like Germany who game late to the game, colonies were a sign of position and power 
among European nations nota primary source of resources and money.  
3Herbst p. 59 and Kroslak p. 19. 
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German government wanted to control the region with as little cost and effort as possible.  
Rwanda offered little more than the prestige of having a colony so Germany wanted to keep 
its costs down.  This led to the Germans having limited interactions with Rwandan natives 
and developing a distinct lack of understanding of Rwandan culture and ethnic makeup.  
They did not come to understand how the tribes and ethnic groups lived and worked together 
and survived in a, more or less, peaceful society. 
The demographics of Rwanda have changed little in the last century and a half.  Three 
ethnic groups divided among a number of clans comprised the population of Rwanda.  The 
clan structure was fluid, allowing members to move between the clans through marriage.4  
The Hutu, the largest of the ethnic groups comprising eighty-four percent of the population, 
was primarily an agricultural group while the Tutsi, comprising roughly fifteen percent of the 
population, were predominantly a pastoral people.  The Twa people, the remaining one 
percent, were forest dwelling hunters and gatherers. 5   The clans reflected the three ethnic 
groups and remained together by a clientele institution, whereby the king would gift cattle 
and other goods to elites in exchange for loyalty.6 Despite the composite nature of the clans, 
they maintained strong clan identities that, for some, lasted into the modern day.7 It was 
possible for individuals to move between the ethnic groups by the grace and pleasure of the 
king, or other elites.  Moving from a lower prestige group to a higher one could serve as a 
means of rewarding supporters and friends.  It was also possible for individuals and groups to 
move down the social ladder into less prestigious groups. 
                                                          
4
 The Clans of Rwanda: An Historical Hypothesis by David S. Newbury Africa: Journal of the International African 
Institute, vol. 50, no. 4 1980  
5
 CIA World Fact Book https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/rw.html and Allison 
Des Forges, Leave None to tell the Story, p. 32-35. 
6
 Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda by Alison Desforges March 1999 p. 31-32. 
7
 David S. Newbury p. 390  
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The Nyifinya was the most prominent clan during the nineteenth century.  By the 
latter half of the century, the Nyifinya king (the Mwami) established a centralized state 
within Rwanda.  The Mwami controlled the surrounding clans, dispensing his favor in gifts 
of cattle, lands and allowing Hutu and Twa to become Tutsi.8  This system lasted until the 
Belgians took control of Rwanda.  The German colonial authority used the control and 
organization of the Nyifinya and the Mwami to help control Rwanda.  The German colonial 
authority did not understand the fluid nature of Rwandan society and believed that the Tutsi 
held a static position as rulers of Rwanda.  They believed that the Tutsi ruled over a feudal 
style government that kept the Hutu and Twa subject to them.9   
The end of the First World War left Germany devastated.  The Treaty of Versailles 
placed harsh stipulations on Germany, including accepting responsibility for the war itself.  
Along with forcing Germany to pay war reparations to the victors, Germany had to relinquish 
control of its colonial possessions to the new League of Nations.  The League assigned 
Rwanda to Belgium.  Belgium instituted a series of changes to its governing structures to fit 
with the method of direct rule that it had established in its other African holdings, such as the 
Congo.10  The Belgians wanted a stronger hand in running the country and so - during the 
1920s - created a system of chiefdoms and sub chiefdoms of uniform size that controlled 
distribution of goods and administration of the country.  The Belgian administration 
centralized the chiefdom system from a multilayered chiefdom of Hutu and Tutsi to one level 
controlled by Tutsi.  The Tutsi maintained their position as the leaders while the Belgians 
                                                          
8
 The UN and Rwanda 1993-1996 p. 7 section 15.  
9
 Jones p. 18 and Des Forges p. 33. 
10
 US State Department website http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2861.htm. 
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retooled the system of sub chiefdoms and local leaders to eliminate the vast network of local 
and regional leaders.  The Belgian colonial authority instituted a similar system where a set 
number of regional and local Tutsi leaders answered to the colonial authority. This worked to 
ease the burdens of government on the local peoples. The Belgian authority built off 
preexisting social and governing structures the Germans had begun and combined them with 
racial and ethnic misconceptions about the evolution and heredity of the Hutu and Tutsi to 
elevate the Tutsi into a position of administration and decreed that the Tutsi were the only 
group that should be officials.  The Catholic Church supported this system of discrimination 
by socially elevating the Tutsi and granting them greater access to education.  Early Catholic 
missionaries refused to teach Hutus because they believed them racially inferior.11  This 
barred the majority Hutu from higher offices and higher education as the Belgians and Tutsi 
expected them to subsist as the lower class.12  This forced the Hutu to reside as low income 
farmers and wage workers with little to no chance for economic or social advancement. 
Belgian misconceptions about race, ethnicity and local power structures led to the 
solidification of Tutsi control of the country and served to aggravate race relations between 
the Tutsi and Hutu.  They believed that the Tutsi most resembled the Belgians and were 
therefore more closely to the Europeans than the Hutu or Twa.  They perceived the Tutsi as 
being the naturally superior group because of their supposed close genetic relationship to 
Europeans and missed Hutu contributions to building Rwanda.13  Belgians based this on such 
pseudo-scientific practices as phrenology, which used measurements of a subject’s skull and 
facial features to make determinations about a group of people.  Such practices led Belgians 
                                                          
11
 Kroslak p. 20-21 Des Forges p. 33 and 34. 
12
 Des Forges p. 34 
13
 Des Forges p. 34 
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to believe that the Tutsi were higher on the evolutionary scale than the other ethnic groups 
and were therefore the most worthy of elevation.  
These changes set the groundwork for the ethnic problems that caused the civil war 
culminating in the 1994 genocide.  These Belgian changes made it easier for the Tutsi elites 
to oppress their people, as the traditional means of fleeing to other clans in different locations 
was no longer available.  Belgian administrative changes restricted Hutu to new forest 
settlement and placed restrictions on moving between regions within the country.  In the past, 
Rwandans not happy with local officials could easily move to another region or start new 
settlements in the forest.  Belgian administrative changes prohibited these methods of escape.  
The only avenue of escape still open was migrating to other countries, which increased in the 
1920s.14   
They also put ethnic relations in a light that fostered increased conflict.  Relations that 
were once fluid and allowed for transition of groups were now hardened and prevented such 
transitions from taking place.  The old system allowed for a merging of the ethnic groups and 
facilitated amicable relations among them.  There may have been tensions and periodic wars 
fought between regional groups over governing and control of resources such as cattle and 
goods in the past, but prior to the Belgian system of Tutsi domination the three groups lived 
in relative peace.  Use of identification cards that specified a person’s ethnic membership 
further strained ethnic issues.  They made ethnic identity a central tool for administration and 
allotment of goods and resources.   They also made it easier for the police and government 
officials to identify a person’s ethnicity and to discriminate that individual.  Requiring all 
adults to carry these cards and present them when ordered made it difficult if not impossible 
                                                          
14
 Des Forges p. 33 and 34. 
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for most Hutu to pass for Tutsi or Twa.  They were a means of making ethnic membership.  
This practice forced ethnic issues into the public consciousness and made them impossible to 
ignore.15 
Mahmood Mamdani argued in his book, When Victims Become Killers, that Belgian 
changes to the Rwandan government turned tribal identities into political identities.  By 
politicizing the identities of Hutu and Tutsi, and placing the balance of power in the favor of 
the Tutsi, tribal identities became sources of competition and trouble.  Mamdani further 
argued that Rwanda missed the normal course of identity development that would have had 
ethnic identities replaced by a national identity of the people as Rwandans.  The cultural and 
political changes that put the Tutsi above the Hutu created the mindset of the Tutsi as a 
settler population forcing their control over the native (Hutu) population.  Mamdani argued 
that these identity structures paved the way for the Hutu-Tutsi identity conflict that allowed 
the genocide to occur.16 
The end of the Second World War, ushered in the Cold War between the United 
States and the Soviet Union, saw the founding of the United Nations and witnessed the end 
of European colonization.  Liberation of African colonies was a key part of this de-
colonization movement.  The United Nations oversaw the removal of colonial controls and 
the creation of new states to ensure that former colonies became stable states.  The UN used a 
                                                          
15
 The UN and Rwanda p. 8.   Mahmood Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and 
Genocide in Rwanda, p. 34. 
16
 Mamdani chapter 1: Defining the Crisis of Postcolonial Citizenship: Settler and Native as Political Identites, 
p. 19 to 39.  Mamdani argued that there are two types of genocidal impulses originating from colonialism.  The 
first is “genocide of the native by the settler” wherein the colonial power uses force to pacify a native 
population.  The second is “the native impulse to eliminate the settler" where the native population uses force to 
throw off the rule of the colonial power.  Mamdani argued that, for the perpetrators, the genocide was a case of 
a native population using force against a settler population.  The political divisions enforced by German and 
Belgian rule turned the Tutsi into a settler population and the Hutu into a native population.  The discussion of 
settler and native genocides takes place on p. 8 to 10. 
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trust system wherein a colony in the process of gaining independence would have a sponsor 
state that guided its independence.   When both the UN and the sponsoring state believed a 
colonial holding was ready for independence it was granted statehood and membership in the 
UN. 
 In 1946, Rwanda became a trusteeship of the League of Nations, which the United 
Nations continued under the UN International Trusteeship System.17  The UN favored 
Rwanda becoming an independent country, but believed that it needed a period of 
development under the UN’s direction before it could operate on its own.  Belgium became 
the administrator of the trusteeship because it had experience with administering Rwanda 
after the First World War. 
Rwanda began its downward spiral towards the 1994 genocide after becoming a UN 
trusteeship.  The Tutsi continued to dominate the government retaining the Belgian-imposed 
suppression of the Hutu.  Groups of Hutu began pushing for a complete reform of the 
government and economy.  Economic problems and mounting racial tensions led to a Hutu 
led coup at the end of the 1950s.  A number of politically minded and reform oriented groups 
emerged at this time.  Many of these groups, like Parmehutu, pushed for Hutu freedom from 
both Tutsi of the government and Belgian influence over the country.18   In 1959, the Hutu 
opposition, led by Gregoire Kayibanda, overthrew the Tutsi Monarchy, to whom the Belgian 
colonial administration had given tremendous power.  Thousands of Tutsi fled Rwanda for 
                                                          
17
 US State Department website http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2861.html, and The UN and Rwanda 1993-
1996 p. eight.  
18Jones p. eight and Des Forges p. 36 and 37. 
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neighboring countries, primarily Uganda, fearing Hutu reprisals for decades of suppression 
and mistreatment and marked the beginning of the “Hutu peasant revolution”.19 
The Hutu revolution lasted for three years and ended in 1961 when The Party of Hutu 
Emancipation Movement took power after winning a UN supervised referendum.20  The 
referendum, which took place in September 1961, placed the fate of the Mwami monarch in 
the hands of the voters.  The Hutu swept the election claiming thirty-seven seats in the new 
legislature while the Tutsi won seven.  The vote ended the Mwami monarchy and the Hutu 
and Tutsi agreed to establish a republican government.21 
During the revolution, the Union Nationale Rwandaise (UNAR) - the Tutsi ruling 
party- planed on eliminating troubling members of the Hutu elite, but the Hutu struck first.22  
Belgium initially wanted to help the Tutsi monarch hold onto power, but pressure from the 
UN and the desire to help Rwanda achieve independence and a growing concern over how 
long it would take the fading colonial power to leave Rwanda led the European state to side 
with the growing Hutu authority.  Belgian leaders decided that it would be easier to switch 
support to the growing Hutu regime than to continue to aid the Tutsi monarch.23  To this end, 
the Belgians helped the Hutu Party of Emancipation set up a new administration.  The next 
year Rwanda gained full independence.  On January 1, Belgium granted Rwanda autonomy 
and in June the UN, trusteeship ended.  On July 1, 1962, the UN granted Rwanda full 
                                                          
19
 The UN and Rwanda p. eight and Des Forges p. 36. 
20
 US State Department website http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2861.htm.  Des Forges p. 36 and The UN and 
Rwanda p. eight.   
21
 The UN and Rwanda 1993-1996 p. 9. 
22
 Jones p. 20. Des Forges p. 36.  
23
 Jones p. 20. 
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independence.  On September 18, 1962, Rwanda and Burundi earned membership in the 
UN.24 
The situation in Rwanda continued to degrade throughout the 1970s.  Since 
independence, displaced persons within Rwanda and refugees outside the country created 
mounting problems for the stability and development of Rwanda.   In 1964, the UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees estimated that there were over 150,000 Tutsi refugees in 
neighboring countries.25  A Tutsi resistance group calling itself inyenzi (cockroaches) made 
over a dozen attacks against the Hutu regime between 1961 and 1966.26  Gregoire 
Kayibanda-the leader of the new Hutu dominated Rwandan government- ordered violent 
reprisals against those guerillas that the army could find and anyone it deemed a collaborator.  
Kayibanda ordered reprisal attacks against Tutsi civilians still in Rwanda, forcing thousands 
more to flee to neighboring countries like Burundi, Uganda, Zaire and Tanzania.27 These 
reprisals caused the inyenzi to lose their taste for fighting by 1966 and most Tutsi sought a 
way to live normal lives.28  
Mounting tensions with refugees, rebel groups and economic problems within the 
country led to the overthrow of Kayibanda’s regime.   In 1973, Major General Juvenal 
Habyarimana-a Hutu from the northern Bushiru clan led a military coup.  On July 5, he took 
control of the government and abolished all political parties to strengthen his position.  
Habyarimana spent the next five years solidifying his rule and in 1978 won a Presidential 
election bringing his National Revolutionary Movement for Development (MRND) party 
                                                          
24
 The UN and Rwanda 1993-1996 p. 9. 
25
 The UN and Rwanda 1993-1996 p. 10. 
26Paul Kagame and Rwanda: power, genocide and the Rwandan Patriotic Front by Colin Waugh p. 27-29. 
27
 The UN and Rwanda 1993-1996 p. 10. 
28
 Waugh p. 27-29  
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into full power.29  He solidified his power by consolidating political authority in the MRND, 
making it the only legally recognized political party, the Mouvement Revolutionnaire 
National pour le Développement (MRND), and filled its membership with members of his 
own clan.  His clan involvement isolated both Tutsi and southern Hutu.  Over the next 
decade, Habyarimana consolidated his power around a clan-based oligarchy called an akazu, 
which his clan dominated.30    
He brought ethnic divisions into greater focus through sweeping economic and 
administrative changes.  He instituted policies that forcibly moved groups of Tutsi and Hutu 
from one region to another so that the government could establish “ethnic and regional 
balance”.31 
After the Hutu overthrew the Mwami monarch in 1961, thousands of Tutsi fled the 
country fearing reprisals from the new Hutu authority for decades of one-sided government.  
The refugees found temporary homes in countries like Tanzania, Zaire and Uganda.  Many of 
them spent decades living in refugee camps while others attempted to assimilate into the 
population of their host countries.  Still others desired to return to their native Rwanda but 
continued to fear what the new Hutu government would do to them. 
Sadly, the end of European colonization left many challenges for other peoples and 
governments in Africa to face.  Much as the Belgians had favored the western-looking Tutsis 
over the majority Hutus [and minority Twas], the British imported people from the Indian 
sub-continent to dominate government and economy in its former territories.  This only 
added to existing tribal and clan tensions.  One place where this all boiled up was Uganda 
                                                          
29
 US State Department website http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2861.htm. 
30
 Jones p. 21-26 and Des Forges p. 37-39. 
31
 The UN and Rwanda 1993-1996 p. 10 and 11. 
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where, from 1971 through 1979, Idi Amin Dada ruled the country, expelled these Indian sub-
continent ethnic Ugandans, and engaged in brutal suppression of several ethnic groups.  In 
1979, the Tanzanian army augmented by Ugandan exiles expelled him.32 
After Amin’s expulsion, Milton Obote regained the presidency and began a regime 
characterized by authoritarian rule.  Accusations of corruption spread after Obote’s 1980 
presidential victory.  These accusations culminated in the start of a guerilla war led by 
Yoweri Museveni and his National Resistance Army.  Museveni allied with several minority 
and ethnic groups in Uganda oppressed by Obote.  He sided with the Tutsi refugees in 
Uganda, helping them find shelter and resources.  He supported their plight and offered them 
political aid against the Ugandan government, which tired of their presence and wanted them 
expelled from Uganda.33   
Museveni’s promises and the support of ethnic groups inspired a group of second-
generation Tutsi refugees, known as Banyarwandans and second-generation fifty-niners 
because their parents had fled to Uganda in 1959, to side with Museveni in his guerilla war 
against Milton Obote.  Museveni incorporated many of his Tutsi allies into the new 
government.  The Tutsi guerillas received positions in the reformed security apparatus of 
Uganda.  Paul Kagame and Fred Rwigyema, the military and political leaders of the Tutsi 
guerillas, received positions as the deputy chief of military intelligence and the deputy 
minister of defense respectively.34 
                                                          
32United States Department of the State website: Background note Uganda  
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2963.htm  
33
 Kroslak p. 33 and Colin M. Waugh, Paul Kagame and Rwanda: power, genocide and the Rwandan Patriotic 
Front, p. 35-40.  United States Department of State website: Background note: Uganda 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2963.htm  
34
 Jones p. 22-23 and Des Forges p. 42. 
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Factions within Museveni’s movement had pushed for the expulsion of the Rwandans 
so that Ugandans would not have to compete with them.  The great economic challenges that 
Uganda faced helped flame ethnic tensions.  Ugandans did not like the idea of outsiders 
attaining high ranks and prestigious positions within the new government because, though 
the Tutsi supporters helped overthrow Obote’s government, they were not Ugandan natives 
or citizens.  Dissenters within Museveni’s fledgling government pushed for the removal of 
Tutsis from positions within the government and even removal from Uganda.  Opponents to 
Museveni’s rule raised ethnic and racial issues as a means of undermining Museveni’s 
control by cutting off support from a number of native ethnic groups.  They pointed to Tutsi 
in the government and spread rumors and propaganda about Tutsi favoritism in receiving 
resources and opportunities.   Mounting pressures forced Museveni to side with political 
expediency and begin urging his supporters to seek repatriation to Rwanda.35 
Increased tensions over Tutsi presence in the government and the general population 
brought dangers of ethnic violence.  Local Ugandans resented the competition presented by 
those they perceived as outsiders and began finding ways of venting their anger.  The Tutsi 
decided that it would be better to take up the fight against the ruling Hutu and return home 
than face attacks by Ugandan guerillas.36   
The first group of Tutsi to push for repatriation formed in 1979 as a political 
opposition to Habyarimana’s regime.37  The Rwandan Alliance for National Unity, 
representing Hutu and Tutsi refugees, originally attempted to find a diplomatic solution to the 
                                                          
35
 Jones p. 22, 23, and Kroslak p. 33 and 34. 
36
 Waugh p. 40-43. 
37
 Defense Intelligence Report J2-210-94, 9 May 1994. 
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repatriation issue.38 However, Habyarimana was not willing to allow refugees to return to the 
country.  Habyarimana had attempted a series of economic and political changes that he 
hoped would lead to the development of the country and the continuation of French support.  
At the summit in La Baule, French President Francois Mitterrand declared that French aid 
would be dependent on democratic reforms in Franco-African countries.39 Unfortunately, 
Rwanda’s agriculture based economy was slow to develop due to a mix of domestic setbacks 
and difficult international competition.   
By the 1980s, Rwanda’s population already the densest in Africa was reaching 
critical mass.  A drastic drop in world coffee prices put great strains on the highly agrarian 
Rwandan economy.  Coffee was Rwanda’s chief export comprising 75% of its foreign 
income by the end of the 1980s.  In 1989, a drought followed the market drop to add further 
trouble to Rwanda’s poor, who lived primarily off subsistence agriculture.  Habyarimana 
initially discounted the magnitude of the famine and demanded that production quotas 
continue to be met.  Failure to meet the quotas would inhibit the equal distribution of 
resources among the ten prefectures in Rwanda. 40   
Strict control and distribution of resources to Habyarimana’s supporters and Hutu 
from Habyarimana’s home prefecture of Gisenyi led to increased domestic problems.  
Intellectuals and political leaders demanded government and economic reforms.  They 
targeted government corruption made evident by the blatant favoritism of Habyarimana’s 
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supporters.  International donors like the World Bank who began tying economic aid to 
democratic reforms mirrored calls for increased democratization among Rwandans.41  
The Rwandan government directed tensions away from its own faults with new anti-
Tutsi rhetoric.  Habyarimana riled the Hutu population against both domestic Tutsi 
populations and the displaced ones seeking to return home.  In 1987, the Rwandan Patriotic 
Front (RPF) with many Tutsi veterans of the fighting in Uganda formed under the belief that 
force was the only way to achieve repatriation.42 
What started in 1979 as a political opposition to Habyarimana’s regime became the 
RPF by 1987.  By 1987, Tutsi from the Ugandan army dominated the organization.43  
Throughout the 1980s, the RPF attempted a negotiated resettlement.  The GOR initially 
blocked all thoughts of refugees returning.  In 1982, the GOR expelled thousands of refugees 
pushed into Rwanda from Uganda and in 1986; the GOR announced that Rwanda was 
overpopulated to allow the repatriation of all refugees.  For a brief moment in 1989, it looked 
as though the GOR would be willing to come to an agreement on repatriation.  The GOR 
formed a commission to negotiate with Ugandan officials, which met three times throughout 
the year.  By the final meeting, held in July 1990, it looked as though the Ugandan 
government and the GOR would come to terms.  However, the RPF was determined to end 
the issue on its own terms and added the reformation of the GOR to its goals.  It now sought 
the removal of Habyarimana and the democratization of the government to secure better 
Tutsi representation.44   
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 The RPA formed under the leadership of Paul Kagame and Fred Rwigyema to serve 
as the military army of the RPF and to bring the exiled Tutsi home to Rwanda.  The new 
militant Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) had a core of Tutsi guerillas that fought for 
Museveni. Colonel Alexis Kanyarweng, a Hutu, served as president of the political arm of 
the RPF and served as the public face of the organization.  General Paul Kagame, born in 
southern Rwanda in 1957, served as the military commander of much of the RPF forces and 
was the mastermind of RPF policy.45 
 The RPF recognized the difficulty of seeking a diplomatic solution to the repatriation 
issue; Habyarimana resisted and even used repatriation for a rally-around-the-flag effect to 
keep support for his government despite failed economic and political reforms that caused 
waves within Rwanda.  The presence of a paramilitary organization willing to use violence as 
a means of persuasion caused a great deal of problems for Habyarimana.  The RPF poised on 
the border of Uganda ready to attack government positions inside Rwanda presented more 
than just military problems.  The Hutu majority feared what an independent, largely battle-
tested, armed group of Tutsi with a grudge to bear could do if they entered the country.  
There was a very real fear that the RPF and groups like them would indiscriminately kill 
Hutu in retaliation for expulsion and decades of unfair treatment.  It was a very real fear of 
revenge for the Hutu turning the tables on the Tutsi during the revolution of the 1960s. 
  Habyarimana sought allies and assistance to resist the RPF.  In December 1989, he 
asked Herman Cohen, Assistant Secretary of State for Africa from 1989 to 1993, if the 
United States had any information on RPF movements along the Ugandan border.  The CIA 
stopped monitoring events in the Great Lakes Region but was hesitant to reveal its lack of 
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involvement so Cohen told Habyarimana that his government did not have any information 
on RPF movements.46 
The RPF launched a major attack on the Habyarimana government on October 1, 
1990, from bases in Uganda aiming to take the capital Kigali.  The RPF engaged FAR with 
7,000 troops under the command of Fred Rwigyema, who died during the opening salvos 
leaving Paul Kagame in command.47  Kagame reorganized the offensive from a conventional 
assault on Government forces and positions to a guerilla war.48   The RPF chose October 1 
because Habyarimana was in France attending the Franco-African summit and the RPF 
leaders wanted to capitalize on his absence. The rush for Kigali failed because government 
troops were better equipped and knew the terrain better than the RPF and the local population 
had been subject to a propaganda campaign instilling fear of the RPF.49   Government forces 
received support from Zairian troops and French officers who trained and armed the troops.50  
Government troops had numerical and technological superiority over their RPF counterparts, 
but the RPF guerillas had experience.  The disparity in training gave the RPF the advantage 
so by 1993 the RPF controlled nearly two percent of the territory in north along the border 
with Uganda.51  When the RPF invaded, Habyarimana quickly increased the size of the Army 
of Rwanda (FAR) from 5,000 to 30,000.  The government of Rwanda (GOR) sacrificed 
training for numbers when it rapidly increased the size of the army.  Habyarimana feared that 
the battle-tested RPF would overwhelm the limited Rwandan army.52 
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Despite initial setbacks the war continued.  The RPF achieved much greater success 
after Paul Kagame turned to a guerilla war.  Tutsi veterans from the Ugandan civil war had 
prior experience fighting a guerilla war giving them a distinct advantage over the government 
troops who had no experience resisting a guerilla force.  Zairian President Mobutu Sese Seko 
viewed Uganda as a threat and so wanted to check any advance of Ugandan power in the 
region.  Mobutu saw this as a chance to garner more favor with France and Belgium who 
were coming to Habyarimana’s aid.  He therefore agreed to have 500 Zairian troops support 
government soldiers in the early days of the civil war. The government lost faith in the Zaire 
troops after their devastating loss to RPF guerillas in a very limited engagement and reports 
of their looting nearby towns and villages.53  The Rwandan army removed the troops by 
October 18 after their loss believing that their undisciplined and ineffective fighting would 
do more harm than good if left in the field.54 
The US believed that a government victory depended on foreign support.  Their 
troops were outmatched and the only way they would be able to stand up to continued 
guerilla war was if they could continue to outnumber RPF troops.  The only way the 
government forces could win was with continued support of arms and equipment to supply 
the rapidly expanding army.  Government officers and officials believed they could win 
through strength of numbers supported by increased flow of arms from allies like France.55 
By 1993, the RPF had pushed government forces out of much of the border regions 
with Uganda.  Supported by supply routes from bases in Uganda the RPF was able to build 
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forward positions from which to launch further attacks on GOR troops and positions.56  
Though it did not hold a large percentage of territory, the PRF was able to use what it did 
have as a doorway for its guerilla forces to enter Rwanda and plague FAR contingents.  It 
was a small holding, but large enough to allow the RPF to continue its war against the GOR. 
Starting on October 2, France provided unofficial military assistance to the GOR.  
The operations began with 300 French troops sent to evacuate 200 French nationals in 
Rwanda.  From there they supported the FAR and GOR by providing $10 million dollars in 
weapons and equipment, guarding the Kigali airport and roads, establishing communications 
and providing pilots for aircraft.57 
Between October 15 and 18 Belgian Prime Minister Wilfried Martens, along with 
several of his top officials, met with President Habyarimana and regional leaders to discuss a 
ceasefire.   Both Museveni and Mobutu were present due to their participation in the war.  
Habyarimana purposefully excluded the RPF from the talks.  Despite Habyarimana agreeing 
to repatriate refugees and allow a joint African force monitor the ceasefire, the talks failed to 
end the fighting because the RPF and the GOR did not have a chance to negotiate over the 
terms together.58  Throughout the final months of 1990 and the beginning of 1991, the RPF 
and GOR continued to fight while regional leaders attempted to negotiate a ceasefire.  Failure 
to bring both parties to the table resulted in a series of failed talks.  It was not until 
Habyarimana met with Museveni on February 17 that the RPF and GOR talked directly.  The 
initial ceasefire lasted until the spring of 1992 when fighting renewed due to the failure of the 
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parties to maintain a politically neutral monitoring force.  Frantic talks took place between 
the RPF, the GOR, regional leaders and European supporters throughout the rest of the year.  
Eventually international political pressure forced the GOR and RPF to reach a lasting 
ceasefire, negotiated at Arusha Tanzania.59  The Arusha Accords presented the chance to end 
more than the civil war.  If the RPF and GOR could honor their commitments to creating a 
power sharing government the long-standing problems between Hutu and Tutsi would have a 
way of ending.   
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           Chapter Two 
           Hopes for peace and thoughts of death: 
  The Arusha Peace Accords, Hutu Power and blueprints for death 
Joel Stettenheim argued that the Arusha peace process needs examined in three 
primary parts.  The first was the pre-negotiation phase where regional leaders pressured the 
GOR and RPF to negotiate an end to the civil war.  Included in this phase was a series of 
stalled talks and failed ceasefires that attempted to bring the warring parties to the same table.  
The second part was the talks in Arusha.  Regional leaders and the UN facilitated these talks.  
Throughout the course of the talks, Habyarimana and Hutu extremists took every opportunity 
to prevent the signing of an agreement, but pressure from France and Belgium convinced 
Habyarimana to play ball.  Issues of refugees and demilitarization were integral parts of these 
talks.  The Arusha talks ultimately ended in an agreement for an integrated government and 
military and the return of refugees displaced before and during the civil war.  Stettenheim 
argued that the third part necessary to understanding the peace process was the failed 
implementation of the Arusha Accords and the genocide that followed.60 
Initial peace efforts focused on humanitarian incentives, namely the mounting refugee 
problem.  On February 19, 1991, Habyarimana attended a summit at Dar-es-Salaam where he 
signed the Declaration on Rwandese Refugees Problem. The Declaration sought the 
repatriation of Rwandan refugees.  Shortly thereafter Habyarimana signed the Zanzibar 
Communiqué in which he finally agreed to negotiate directly with the RPF.61 
On March 29, 1991, the RPF and the Government of Rwanda (GOR) signed the 
N’sele Cease-fire agreement.  It set the agenda for future peace talks between the RPF and 
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the Rwandan government.62  The N’sele Ceasefire failed almost immediately as FAR troops 
attacked RPF positions.  On September 16, the RPF and GOR signed a second ceasefire at 
Gabolite, Zaire.63  The ceasefire at Gabolite solved a greater problem with the negotiation 
efforts.  Previously, President Mobutu of Zaire served as mediator of the talks, but he had 
favored Habyarimana.  His favoring of the GOR stalled the peace efforts because he was 
unwilling to assist the RPF in gaining greater concessions.  The Gabolite ceasefire replaced 
Mobutu with President Mwinyi of Tanzania as the mediator, who was willing to be neutral at 
the negotiations.64 
Key to the Arusha agenda was preparing the way for the Arusha Peace Accords, 
started in June 1992 in Arusha, Tanzania.65  The Arusha Accords were a major international 
effort.  The US, France, the UN, Uganda, Senegal, Zaire, Zimbabwe and Nigeria went to 
great efforts to facilitate the peace talks and to secure stability in the Great Lakes Region.  
Uganda severed as the guarantor of the RPF’s involvement in the talks since Musevini’s 
government held a strong measure of influence over the RPF based in the country.  Senegal’s 
Abdou Diouf served as chair of Organization of Africa Union (OAU) and filled the role of 
the “honest broker”.  Zaire stepped in after its notable absence in earlier peace talks.  Zaire 
had a strong concern over the outcome of the talks since it shared a fragile border with 
Rwanda.  Zimbabwe and Nigeria worked as military observers and signatories for the 
Accords.66  The Mwanza Communiqué formed during talks between Habyarimana, the 
Belgian Prime minister, foreign minister and defense minister.  The Communiqué formalized 
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the involvement of Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania and several other neighboring countries in the 
peace talks.  It shifted the focus of the talks to the guidance of the OAU.  The Zanzibar 
Communiqué later restated the commitment to finding a peaceful solution through a cease-
fire agreement and later peace accords.  The Zanzibar Communiqué established the need for 
a regional conference to handle growing problems with refugees.67 
The US put pressure on Uganda to put pressure on the RPF to agree to the talks.  The 
US’s goal was to take the Ugandan military out of the situation.  The Ugandan military had 
been giving support to the RPF in the form of arms and other supplies and cutting off the 
flow of these supplies was a key US strategy for getting the RPF to enter the talks.  The US 
claimed its involvement was to ensure the continuation of Cold War policy of maintaining 
peace and security in Africa.  Deputy Secretary for Africa within the State Department Irvin 
Hicks organized meetings between the RPF and the GOR to keep the negotiations open.68  
US officials helped the negotiations in other ways.  Charles Snyder helped the GOR prepare 
negotiation books they could use keep information clear during talks.  John Byerly helped the 
RPF develop negotiation tactics so it was on equal footing with the GOR during peace talks.  
The US was able to bring new ideas and proposals to the negotiating table because both sides 
saw it as an unbiased source, unlike France who had a long history of supporting the GOR. 69  
The lack of a neutral arbitrator stalled early peace efforts.  The RPF wanted Museveni to 
serve as the arbitrator but the GOR, Habyarimana and others suspected the Ugandan leader 
of favoring the Tutsi.  This suspicion was not without some measure of truth as fifteen 
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percent of Musevini’s army was comprised of Tutsi from the refugee community within 
Uganda.70 
France played a mixed role in first the civil war and then the peace negotiations.  
Prior to the war, France established close ties with the GOR.  France had won the favor of the 
GOR away from Belgium during the revolution of the 1960s.  France aimed at having a 
greater amount of influence in Francophone Africa.  This led France to develop relations 
with Rwanda so that it could build and maintain its influence in the Great Lakes Region.  The 
Quai d’Orsay –the French political party involved in the Arusha Accords- believed that 
supporting the peace talks were the best way to end the conflict in the region without losing 
its own influence there.  The Quai d’Orsay believed that the RPF was able to defeat the GOR 
military and oust the Hutu government making supporting the GOR extremely costly.  
Supporting the peace process would be less costly for the French and give them a chance to 
maintain their influence in the area.71 
The Communite’ Economique des Pays des Grands Lacs (Economic Community of 
Countries of the Great Lakes Region or CEPGL) was a political grouping of countries in the 
Great Lakes Region that attempted to help with the peace process.  The CEPGL agreed to 
provide a monitoring force for the Rwanda Military Observer Group (MOG) under the 
observation of the OAU Liberation Committee.72 
On July 12, 1992, after over twenty years of fighting, negotiating, killings and 
repression, the two sides signed the N’Sele cease-fire in an attempt to end the fighting.  The 
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ceasefire laid the groundwork for future talks to take place at Arusha, Tanzania.  It was 
believed that the RPF and GOR would finally end their fighting and find a solution to the 
disagreements and conflict.73  
The main tenets of the accords were the creation of a shared government between the 
Hutu and Tutsi using multiparty elections and integration of the RPF into the state army.74  
Though designed to bring peace and stability to Rwanda, the implementation of the Arusha 
Accords provided motivation and excuse for extremists within the Hutu government to take 
drastic actions to protect their own positions. 
The US participated in initiating the accords.  Through the work of Carol Fuller, 
Rwandan desk officer for the State Department, and Herman J. Cohen, the Assistant 
Secretary of State for African Affairs during the administration of President George H.W. 
Bush, the RPF and the Hutu government came together for negotiations. Cohen achieved this 
miracle through working with president Musevini of Uganda, who had been working with 
RPF leadership for several years, by suggesting that Musevini would be able to make a move 
on the refugee issue and take a stab at his long time opponent Habyarimana.75  Cohen also 
argued that the war was stalling and continued fighting would destroy the Rwandan 
economy.  He tried to impress the RPF representatives that they would not be able to gain 
more territory than they had and that to attempt new gains would result in their defeat.76 
Museveni then pressed RPF leadership to be more proactive in returning the refugees to 
Rwanda. 
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Cohen then met with representatives of the GOR and Habyarimana.  On May 10 and 
11, he attempted to convince Habyarimana to negotiate with the RPF, but Habyarimana 
initially refused claiming that the RPF were not Rwandans but Ugandans.  Cohen finally 
convinced Habyarimana to negotiate with the RPF by agreeing to remove the clause that 
Habyarimana step down and allow an interim government to take power.  He told 
Habyarimana’s representatives that he considered the RPF demands to be unreasonable and 
that Museveni would soon press the RPF to lessen them to facilitate negotiations.  Cohen also 
threatened to remove American aid to Uganda if Museveni did not work to end the war.  He 
claimed that the refugee situation was rapidly draining American aid resources and that if the 
war did not end in a timely fashion the US would not be able to continue current aid 
programs.77 
During the negotiations of the Accords, the US functioned as a neutral mediator and 
source of information for the two parties.  The Clinton administration was heavily involved 
in negotiations and peace talks in Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Liberia and Namibia, 
preventing the US from taking a more proactive role in the Arusha talks.  Charles Snyder, the 
director of the Office of African Regional Affairs in the State Department, spent his time 
trying to work a cease-fire and identifying issues that the parties would have to labor through 
in future talks.78 
 The Arusha Accords sought to solve the problems of shared government and military 
between the RPF and GOR, the voluntary repatriation of all refugees, both those from the 
1959 revolution and the current civil war, and the creation of a transitional government.  The 
RPF and GOR approached the negotiating table with different negotiating standpoints that 
                                                          
77
 Stettenheim p. 224. 
78
 Stettenheim p. 223-224. 
30 
 
influenced the course of the talks.  The RPF continued its trend of discipline and 
preparedness by arriving with clear goals in mind outlined in a series of position papers.  The 
RPF was primarily concerned with security issues and wanted, among other things, the return 
of refugees, a power sharing government and the establishment of the rule of law that 
protected individual rights and removed legal protections based on ethnicity.  The RPF 
elicited support of opposition parties within the GOR that wanted to remove Habyarimana 
from power.  The RPF believed that their support would strengthen the RPF’s bargaining 
position.79   
 In contrast, the GOR, weakened by its fragmented nature, lacked a strong bargaining 
position at the summit.  The representatives could not agree on bargaining positions and 
Habyarimana complicated matters by repeatedly moving his support between moderates who 
wanted some kind of reconciliation and hard-liners who did not.  The hard-liners’ clear 
objective was the breakdown of the talks and the continuation of the war.  International 
pressures to find a peaceful settlement blocked those goals, but Habyarimana’s continued 
resistance aided their position at the talks.  The moderates caught in the middle of the debate 
between the RPF and the hard-liners were unable to make a solid stand on any position.  
Habyarimana and the hard-liners feared that the RPF would take control of the government 
through the peace settlement. The RPF stood to gain control over a large portion of both the 
army and the government, as it and the Hutu opposition parties would get the majority of 
seats in the new assembly before the first elections.80 
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 The moderates opposed the war because they believed it was only between the RPF 
and the northern Hutus who made up Habyarimana’s regime, and because they did not fully 
trust the RPF.  They were plagued with fears of Tutsi plots and schemes to take control of 
Rwanda through the negotiations.  Old prejudices of the Tutsi as intellectually superior to the 
Hutu and always scheming for power fed the moderates’ fears.81 
 Habyarimana could not prevent discussions of power sharing from completing.  He 
specifically targeted negotiations over the nature of the transitional government and the 
merging of the army because they would destroy his power base.  Throughout the course of 
the talks, a number of firefights and large-scale killings occurred that increased international 
and domestic pressures on him.  RPF retaliation and their victories increased the likelihood 
that the FAR would lose to the guerillas.  The RPF made considerable territorial gains during 
an offensive in February 1993 giving them a stronger negotiating position.  The offensive 
was in response to a massacre at Bgogwe where 300 Tutsi died.82 Domestic pressures 
increased as the cost of the war mounted and the threat of an RPF victory became more 
prevalent.  Opposition parties working with the RPF, despite fears and mistrust of the Tutsi 
dominated organization, increased problems for Habyarimana and combined with 
international pressures to force Habyarimana to the table. France threatened to remove its 
troops, which Habyarimana depended on to protect communications and transportation lines, 
in conjunction with other Western supporters threatening the removal of financial aid finally 
convinced Habyarimana to cooperate.83   
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 The Arusha Accords, signed on August 4, 1993, set up a framework for an integrated 
government and military.  The FAR and Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA), the military branch 
of the RPF, would merge with 60 percent of the troops coming from the FAR and 40 percent 
coming from the RPA.  They would divide the officer ranks equally between the two.  
Furthermore, they were to reduce the size of the army to 13,000 troops and officers, meaning 
that 30,000 soldiers would be out of work.84 
 One of the most important parts of the peace process was the creation of a UN 
peacekeeping force to monitor the cease-fire and implementation of the Arusha Accords.  
Sustaining a ceasefire required the presence of monitors of the implementation of peace 
agreements. To this end, the UN established the United Nations Assistance Mission for 
Rwanda (UNAMIR) on October 5, 1993.85  UNAMIR’s mandate was to: 
(A)ssist in ensuring the security of the capital city of Kigali; monitor the 
ceasefire agreement, including establishment of an expanded demilitarized zone 
and demobilization procedures; monitor the security situation during the final 
period of the transitional Government’s mandate leading up to elections; assist 
with mine-clearance; and assist in the coordination of humanitarian assistance 
activities in conjunction with relief operations. 86 
 
General Romeo Dallaire (the commanding officer of UNAMIR) wrote in specific 
instructions on what the UN soldiers were to do if they encountered crimes against humanity.  
He wrote, “UNAMIR will take the necessary action to prevent any crime against 
humanity.”87  Aside from this one order UNAMIR’s other rules of engagement were 
ambiguous.  The peacekeepers could not use force except under strict circumstances.  They 
                                                          
84
 Klinghoffer p.30.  A large number of Hutu extremists and hardliners came out of this group.  They worked to 
undermine the implementation of the Accords to preserve their jobs and prevent the RPF from taking power. 
85
 Des Forges p. 132 and United Nations website: 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/mission/past/unamirM.htm and UN Security Council Resolution 872. 
86
 United Nations website: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/mission/past/unamirM.htm 
87
 Des Forges p. 133. 
33 
 
had to do their work by the force of their presence and their ties to the greater UN on its own.  
They were allowed to use violent force in joint operations with the Rwandan national police 
or if they came under fire from enemy combatants.88 
 General Dallaire received 2,548 troops to monitor and enforce the ceasefire and 
implementation of the Arusha Accords.89   The troops came from UN member states who 
volunteered members of their military to assist in UN peacekeeping operations.  Belgium 
provided 420 peacekeepers for the UNAMIR operation while the majority of the UNAMIR 
troops (2,100) came from African countries-such as Ghana, which could supply men but few 
arms and other equipment. Six hundred engineering, medical, logistics and headquarters 
personnel that were to help in the daily, non-combat operations of the mission supported 
these troops.  They made up for the shortage of equipment through donations of arms, 
vehicles, food and medical supplies by other UN member states that were willing to supply 
material support for UN peacekeeping missions but not combat personnel.90 
 UNAMIR personnel faced an operation expecting them to prevent two warring 
factions from restarting a war fueled by nearly one hundred years of ethnic hatred with little 
more than the white “UN” letters painted on their light-blue helmets.  When their situation 
began to lead toward renewed war, UNAMIR faced a devastating lack of support from the 
very organization that created it and the world powers that were supposed to lend it their 
credibility.  General Dallaire and his command staff saw a wealth of warning signs that told 
them the violence was going to begin again.  Dallaire attempted to inform his superiors at the 
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UN of the impending violence and to seek their support in changing UNAMIR’s mandate to 
allow it a more proactive role in keeping the peace. 
Between August 1992 and April 1994, the Habyarimana regime and the RPF 
struggled over how to implement the Arusha Accords.91   Habyarimana played a delicate 
balancing game of cooperating with the implementation process at some points and then 
blocking it at others.  He attempted to protect his position from domestic contestants within 
the GOR who wanted to prevent the implementation of the Arusha Accords and renew the 
war, and international pressures demanding the full implementation of the Accords.  Failure 
to keep his domestic opposition appeased risked an internal coup and likely his death.  
Failure to appease international pressures risked the loss of international aid and greater 
efforts by the UN, France and other interested parties to push through the Accords. 
Dissenters within the government sought to protect their own positions in power-
which they stood to lose with the full implementation of the Accords.  They also wanted to 
prevent the sharing of power with the Tutsis they had spent their lives hating and repressing.  
Colonel Theoneste Bagosora, who worked with the Minister of Defense, and had taken part 
in the negotiations for the Arusha Accords, faced forced retirement and the loss of position 
when they integrated the Rwandan Army and the RPA.  He was a life-long military man who 
believed that the Tutsi needed to be defeated in a military conflict and that negotiations like 
those at Arusha were a mistake.  Bagosora won support among military, political leaders and 
other influential members of the Hutu hierarchy.  His supporters included Habyarimana’s 
wife and brother.92 
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A number of other Hutu officers faced this same fate, and joined under Bagosora’s 
leadership to find a way to protect their power.93   A handful of political and military leaders 
within the MRND party initially sought to hold onto their power within the government and 
as such worked to prevent the Accords from implementation.  The group became a political 
group calling itself Hutu Power, and built its political plank around ethnic strife and called 
for a Hutu uprising over the growing influence of Tutsis and the RPF in Rwanda.  These 
plans eventually evolved into plans for the mass murder of every Tutsi within Rwanda’s 
borders.94 
Bagosora and his supporters enacted plans to counter RPF influence and moderates 
within the Rwandan government.  They required a political and military aspect to their plans.  
They centered the military aspect of their plan on control of elite troops like the Presidential 
Guard and local militias called interahmwe. The Presidential Guard opposed integrating with 
RPF soldiers.  The Presidential Guard began targeting prominent Tutsi and moderate Hutus 
sympathetic to reconciliation between the GOR and RPF within the country.95 
 The interahmwe began as a program to support the military during the civil war.  The 
idea was that the Rwandan Army would focus on fighting the war while the militia would 
serve as a security apparatus for the frontier regions that lacked a strong army presence. 
Eventually, extremists turned them into the military arm of their political and opposition 
parties within the government.96   Army officers trained militia members in the use of 
traditional weapons; spears, bows and arrows, clubs and machetes, to cut expenses of arming 
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and training them in the use of modern weapons like Kalashnikovs. Once the interahmwe 
became an arm of the Hutu Power, the dissenters within the MRND began training them in 
secret to prevent both their opposition within the government and the RPF from knowing 
about them.97  During the early 1990s, France helped train and arm the militias assuming that 
they would support the Rwandan armed forces against the RPA.98  The training process 
included political indoctrination that set them against first the Tutsis of the RPF and second 
Hutu that would oppose the impending genocide. 
Part of the indoctrination of the militias and the army included clearly defining who 
the enemy they were preparing for was.  Military and political leaders met to determine who 
to target and how to present these targets to their subordinates.  Colonel Nsabimana- the 
army chief of staff- issued a letter defining who the enemy was on September 21, 1992.  The 
letter was the formalization and dissemination of a memo circulating among the army high 
command earlier in September.  The memorandum and the letter pointed to Tutsi seeking to 
reassert Tutsi domination of Rwanda and the RPF as the primary enemies of the people and 
the government.99 
This program was supported by AMASASU (Alliance of Soldiers Provoked by the 
Age-Old Deceitful Acts of Unarists) a political body of soldiers that were opposed to 
Habyarimana’s cooperation with the Arusha Accords and feared the return of the Tutsi 
Royalist Party.100   AMASASU received support from Akazu, another extremist group within 
the government that warned that the RPF were trying to return Rwanda to a time when the 
Tutsi monarch ruled over the Hutu.  These groups worked with the Party for the Coalition for 
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the Defense of the Republic (CDR) to progress their aims of stopping the integration of the 
government and army and the return of the Tutsi to a position of power in Rwanda.101 
Despite the efforts taken to keep these programs secret, clues to their existence and 
their objectives leaked to those who could have possibly stopped them.  Rumors of training 
camps, arms shipments and secret lists of supporters of these programs and those that stood 
in their way circulated among a handful of people within the GOR.  These rumors and hard 
evidence of these events reached members of the international community and the deaf ears 
that directed them. 
The US was directly involved with the extremely poor handling of the many warning 
signs of the impending tragedy. Major General Romeo Dallaire, commander of the United 
Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), had seen the violence coming; but the 
UN mandate limited him to a passive observation role and was unable to do more to stop the 
genocide.   
On January 11, 1994, Dallaire requested protection for an informant, a man in charge 
of training interahamwe, which had given him an outline of the plans made for the genocide. 
Included in these plans were locations of militia arms caches and plans to run the Belgian and 
UN peacekeepers out of the country by targeting Belgian troops at the beginning of the 
killings.  The planners had spent months buying machetes in bulk to be given to the militias 
and compiling lists of Tutsis and moderate Hutus to target when the chaos began.  The 
Security Council, through Kofi Annan the head of UN peacekeeping operations, told General 
Dallaire to leave the weapons alone and to inform the Rwandan President of the leaked 
information despite knowing that those behind these training camps and weapons caches 
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were members of the President’s inner circle.102  Annan initially doubted the validity of the 
information, thinking that the informant intended to lead the UN mission in the wrong 
direction.  Annan believed that the UN would be able to deter the outbreak of violence by 
informing the extremists within Habyarimana’s party that the UN knew about their plans.103 
There had been a number of other reports on the buildup of weapons and troops by 
Belgian intelligence officers, the Belgian ambassador to Kigali and clergy in Nyundo, a 
northeastern region.  There were other warning signs that the UN ignored.  RTLM radio in 
Kigali broadcasted anti-Tutsi propaganda for months prior to the genocide. The broadcast 
spread rumor of RPF plans to infiltrate the country and to subvert the government.  They 
claimed that the RPF would kill any Hutu that they could in a war between the ethnicities. 
They based many of these rumors on events taking place in Burundi.  Ethnic problems in 
Burundi mirrored those in Rwanda.  Tutsi had dominated the Burundian government until 
1993 after which the government became more open to Hutu.  They held open elections for 
the first time in decades in which Melchior Ndadaye won the presidency.  He worked to 
integrate Tutsi and Hutu in the government to bring both sides to the ethnic conflict together.  
Tutsi extremists in Burundi wanted to hold onto their power, in the same way that Hutu 
extremists did in Rwanda.  On October 21, 1993, Tutsi army officers assassinated Ndadaye 
and set off a series of mass murders perpetrated by both Tutsi and Hutu militants.  
Announcers on RTLM warned that the RPF was in league with Tutsi in Burundi and that 
they would bring the killing to Rwanda once they took power in Burundi.104 
                                                          
102Des Forges p. 57-69, 118-119 and Front Line Report: Warning Signs. 
103
 Ghosts of Rwanda.  Outgoing Code Cable January 11, 1994 General Dallaire Request For Protection For 
Informant.  Gourevitch p. 104-107. 
104
 Des Forges p. 134-135, Cohen p. 54. 
39 
 
Scattered killings and attacks throughout the months leading to the genocide, and 
during the negotiations of the Accords, served as practice for the perpetrators and as a means 
of testing international reaction to new outbreaks of violence.  On August 20, 1992, Hutu 
extremists massacred Tutsi and opponents of the Habyarimana regime at Kibuye.105  
Extremists incited further small riots and isolated mass killings as a means of preparing their 
troops for genocide and testing their plans. Human rights organizations ARDHO and 
Association des Volontaires de la Paix reported these attacks on civilians throughout the 
country in November and December 1993. 106  Similar incidents in Burundi helped increase 
acceptance that the peace process would not work in Rwanda because the situations between 
the two countries were so similar.  The lack of an interfering response by the UN and others 
in the international community convinced Hutu extremists that the international community 
was willing to tolerate mass murder in the Great Lakes Region for political ends.  This 
convinced these extremists that they would be able to not only implement their plans for 
genocide, but succeed without fear of reprisal from outside powers.107  The only reprisals the 
extremists faced were from RPF troops.  On February 8, 1993, the RPF attacked FAR 
positions along the northern front.  The RPF claimed that these attacks were to stop the 
killing of Tutsi and political targets that took place in January.108 
Information about arms shipments concerned some in the UN.  The nature and 
quantity of the weapons suggested that the FAR did not intend them for use.    The most 
prevalent of these shipments were shipments of machetes from China.  Habyarimana 
imported an estimated 581,000 machetes in 1993 used to arm the interahamwe in place of 
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expensive guns.109  The GOR claimed that the machetes were going to farmers for use in the 
upcoming harvest season.  Military personnel distributed the weapons to interahamwe bands.  
Being able to buy them in bulk from a country not interested in asking too many questions 
made them the perfect weapons to arm a large body of troops trained to use traditional 
weapons. 
As Bagosora and the Hutu extremists planned for the destruction of the Tutsi and the 
RPF, the RPF prepared plans for the continued war against the GOR.  The RPF leadership 
did not trust that the Arusha Accords would actually bring peace to the country.  They were 
counting on decades of racial tension to continue despite international efforts to end the civil 
war. The RPF began a recruiting campaign of young people, who they trained in RPF 
controlled territory in northern Rwanda.  They trained these recruits as soldiers to fill the 
gaps in their ranks left by losses during the civil war.  The RPF trained a number of these 
recruits to work as political agents within a preexisting intelligence and support network in 
Rwanda.  Their orders were to build sympathy for the RPF cause and gather information of 
local conditions among civilians, the military and the government.  They trained the agents in 
Marxist rhetoric on philosophy, history and economics.  These recruits worked in ethnically 
integrated cells of six to twelve members.  The RPF required these cells to have Hutu 
members working with Tutsi members because they believed it would be easier for the GOR 
to find cells that were exclusively Tutsi.110  Ironically, these intelligence cells were the very 
infiltrators that Hutu propagandist spread rumors about over the radio to increase fear of 
Tutsi manipulations and plans for the conquest of Rwanda. 
                                                          
109
 Des Forges p. 97. 
110
 Des Forges p. 98 and 99. 
41 
 
The US and France, along with other members of the Security Council, argued that 
the best way to prevent future violence was to implement the Arusha Accords.  Belgium 
pressed for a greater international commitment to preventing the violence and solving 
Rwanda’s internal problems, but the US and the United Kingdom blocked this through the 
Security Council.  The Security Council was hesitant to attempt to head off the preparations 
of the Hutu extremists.111  The Clinton administration mirrored this sentiment.  Anthony 
Lake, President Clinton’s National Security Advisor, doubted that the proposed increase of 
troops would not be enough to prevent a slaughter if one happened. 112 
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                          Chapter Three:  
                            A month for each horseman: the genocide in Rwanda 
Early in the morning of April 6, 1994, Rwandan President Habyarimana was 
returning from peace talks in Dar es Salaam, where he supposedly agreed to institute a new 
transitional government.  Cyprien Ntaryamira-the President of Burundi- and General 
Nsabimana- the Chief of Staff of the Rwandan Army (FAR), accompanied him.  As the 
presidential plane approached the airport in Kigali rockets fired from hidden positions near 
the airport shot down the plane killing all passengers.113 
 Within hours of the plane crash, the Hutu hardliners began a systematic mass murder 
of hundreds of thousands of Tutsi and Hutus throughout the country.  Colonel Theoneste 
Bagosora quickly exerted control over the ministers and other high-ranking members of the 
government inside of meetings to determine how to handle the growing crisis.  Part of his 
aim in the meeting was to work the MRND into a position of greater power. General Dallaire 
urged Bagosora to keep Prime Minister Agathe involved in the proceedings to help maintain 
government stability and their honoring of the peace agreements, but Bagosora and other 
officials refused to heed Dallaire’s advice because he was an outsider and they wanted to 
keep the Prime Minister out of the new government they were creating.  The ministers did 
agree to keep a measure of civilian control over the government, supported by a number of 
army officers who argued that the military had no place in politics.114 
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While Bagosora met with the council of ministers and military officers over the 
formation of the government, members of the Presidential Guard and the National Police 
erected barricades and checkpoints all over Kigali.  They claimed these barricades were to 
keep the peace, and to protect the part of Kigali where most of the government officials lived 
when in reality they were the first step in implementing the plans for the genocide.  During 
the opening hours of the genocide, the Presidential Guard and National Police eliminated 
anyone who could have legitimately taken control of and led the government and those 
within the government that Bagosora and his supporters believed would attempt to block 
their plans.  By midday of April 7, all those who could have taken legitimate control of the 
government were gone.115 
On the morning of April 7 Bagosora ordered soldiers from the Presidential Guard to 
arrest Prime Minister Agathe.  He targeted her because she stood in the way of his return to 
power and opposition to the genocide.  General Dallaire had already sent UNAMIR troops to 
protect the Prime Minister at her residence.  Belgian and Ghanaian troops entered a standoff 
with the government troops for several hours as Prime Minister Agathe sought a way to 
escape.  At one point, she attempted to climb over the wall to her neighbor’s home but the 
Presidential Guard saw her and stopped her.  The standoff ended when GOR troops stormed 
the Prime Minister’s residence, took the peacekeepers hostage and arrested Agathe.  Prime 
Minister Agathe was tortured and killed then put on public display as a sign of what would 
happen to those who stood against Bagosora and his supporters.  The GOR troops allowed 
the Ghanaian peacekeepers to leave the Prime Minister’s residence but captured and killed 
the Belgian troops after a day long standoff.  Belgium removed its support from the 
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UNAMIR mission and its troops from Rwanda after the death of the troops.  Bagosora 
wanted to get the states supporting UNAMIR to remove their troops from the country and 
calculated correctly that killing the Belgian troops would get Belgium to do just that.  His 
end goal was to keep the international community from preventing the genocide and so he 
had to run their troops out of the country.116  This same day the Security Council issued a 
directive condemning the violence and ordering the GOR and RPF to honor the Arusha 
Accords.117 
Reports have indicated that the initial number of government troops and others 
supporting their efforts to kill Tutsi and government targets in Kigali were between six and 
seven thousand.118  The movements of the army troops and militia in the opening days of the 
killing made the exact nature of the fighting confusing to outside observers.  During the first 
days, RPF forces within Kigali, numbering around six hundred as per the agreement of the 
Arusha Accords, fought against GOR troops carrying out plans for the genocide.  The RPF 
troops received support from RPF intelligence cells within Kigali that were comprised of 
Hutu and Tutsi.  These confrontations made the killings appear as nothing more than the 
renewal of the civil war.  This confusion over the nature of the fighting led some in the UN to 
refrain from action during the early days of the killing.119 
This confusion was not limited to the international community.  It was unclear who 
was actually in control of the government.  This affected the chain of command as 
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commanders made decisions that their subordinates did not always follow.  There were 
rumors about orders coming through secret networks directing soldiers against targets.  
Rumors of the secret network and confusion about who controlled the government led to 
problems among the lower ranking officers and soldiers over which orders to follow and 
which superiors to trust.  The organization and leadership of the genocide relied less on 
obedience of subordinates than on their willingness to commit mass murder.  The loyalty of 
troops to the military hierarchy came in second to their loyalty to the cause of the genocide.  
During the genocide, subordinates could easily disobey orders from superiors so long as they 
were killing Tutsi.  Low ranking officers and soldiers often took their own initiative to kill 
Tutsi as means of gaining advancement.  Those willing to kill hundreds and thousands of 
their fellow citizens could receive promotion and other rewards for organizing and 
perpetrating massacres.120   
Military officers directed the course of the genocide.  They distributed orders to FAR 
and interahmwe units directing them towards groups of Tutsi and high priority targets.  Army 
officers also gave direction to civilians.  They ordered local populations to support the 
genocide by telling FAR and interahmwe soldiers where to find the hiding places of local 
Tutsi and even to engage in killings of their own.  Soldiers and officers used threats of force 
and withholding government assistance against groups and local leaders who were unwilling 
to support or attempted to stop the genocide in their areas. Neighbors, teachers, friends and 
even children pointed out hiding places and identified Tutsi in their towns.  The threats and 
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propaganda worked so well that family members turned in or killed their own husbands, 
wives and extended family.  As the genocide grew in force and focus, FAR officers allowed 
interahamwe leaders and gangs to threaten and intimidate members of the administration and 
local peoples to ensure their cooperation.121 
After April 6, Army officers gave weapons to civilians and offered military support to 
Hutu fighting against local cells of Tutsi trying to survive.  There are examples of Army 
officers responding to calls for help by local leaders and Hutu attempting to direct the 
killings in their own areas.  There is one such request in a letter from a Hutu medical 
assistant in the commune of Ntyazo: 
Mr. Muhutu A. 
Deputy 
We have a large number of Tutsi at Karama (sector 
headed by the councilor Kanamugire). We have tried to fight 
them, but they have turned out to be stronger than we expected. 
So we ask for your help once again; send us a few National 
Police and four other [communal?] police to help the 
population that is fighting with bows. 
P.S. We have guns and grenades. 
Mathieu 
27/4/9410122 
 
On April 8, RPF troops crossed into Rwanda embarking on a campaign to end the 
killing and to rescue the six hundred RPF personnel trapped in Kigali. RPF leadership had 
warned GOR officials that they would renew military efforts if they did not immediately stop 
the violence.  They launched their campaign to retake Rwanda and rescue Tutsi from the 
violence of FAR and the interahmwe. 123    The renewed RPF offensive did help mask the 
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nature of the violence.  To outsiders, it looked as though the civil war was simply beginning 
again as FAR and RPF troops engaged along the northern border and inside Kigali.124   
Over the next week, the violence escalated from attacks directed against political 
targets inside Kigali to attacks against the general Tutsi population.  By April 11 an estimated 
20,000 people were dead.  An attack on the hospital in Mugonero ended in a systematic 
massacre of Tutsi and moderate Hutu seeking refuge there.  The attackers read the names of 
targeted individuals over the hospital public announce system telling them to come forward 
and directing soldiers on whom to look for.  One survivor described what happened when the 
killing ended: 
They sent people in among the bodies to verify who was dead. 
They said, “Here is the treasurer and his wife and daughter, but 
where is the younger child?” Or, “Here is Josue’s father, his 
wife and mother, but where is he?” And  then, in the days after, 
they tried to hunt you down if they thought you were still alive. 
They would shout out, “Hey Josue, we see you now” to make 
you jump and try to run so that they could see you move and 
get you more easily. 125  
 
The FAR and interahmwe attackers specifically targeted attacks hidden behind the curtain of 
general slaughter.  While executing any Tutsi they found, the attackers searched for specially 
targeted individuals that posed threats to their ability to complete their plans. 
On April 12, MRND Power leader Frodauld Karamira spoke on Radio Rwanda in an 
attempt to rally public support for the genocide.  He claimed that the war was “everyone’s 
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responsibility” and that they should assist the government in the fighting by helping them 
find the enemy within the cities and prefectures and by raising arms against the RPF.126  
 Paul Kagame countered Hutu Power radio appeals to the public with broadcasts of 
his own.  Kagame went on Radio Muhabura to denounce calls for ethnic violence and 
illuminate the political nature of the violence.  He wanted to point out the regional and 
partisan nature of the killings.  Radio des Mille Collines (RTLM) radio countered Kagame’s 
broadcasts by arguing about the damaging Hutu-Tutsi cohesion within the RPF.  RTLM radio 
disseminated false information that Kagame and Kanyarengwe (the Hutu president of the 
RPF) had killed each other in the first days of the violence and that the RPF was going to fall 
into internal chaos.127  Having the leaders of the RPF kill one another was an attempt to drive 
Hutu and Tutsi further against one another. 
The goal of the broadcasts was to break the unity between Hutu and Tutsi that were 
fighting against Hutu Power loyal troops and militia throughout April.  Hutu and Tutsi had 
been mutual members of the RPF for several years.  Intermarriage between Hutu and Tutsi 
within Rwanda over decades built family bonds between the groups that they would not 
abandoned during the genocide.  Hutu came to the defense of Tutsi family members during 
raids and at checkpoints while they fled the cities.  Ties of friendship put Tutsi and Hutu side 
by side against Presidential Guard and militia groups.128 
Bagosora and his supporters made extensive use of Rwanda’s radio stations 
throughout the genocide.  Broadcasters and disc jockeys, like Belgian announcer Georges 
Ruggiu working for RTLM, who supported the genocide routinely broadcast anti-Tutsi 
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propaganda and the locations of groups of Tutsis trying to flee the country. For months prior 
to the genocide, Hutu Power affiliated radio stations broadcast anti-Tutsi propaganda.  They 
spread stories of Tutsi conspiracies to take Rwanda and kill Hutu in retaliation for the 1959 
revolution.  Once the genocide started, the radio stations claimed that the Hutu had to destroy 
their enemy before the Tutsi destroyed them.  They claimed that all Tutsi were going to rise 
against the Hutu and slaughter them like animals.  The broadcasts told Hutu where to find 
Tutsi and how to kill them. 129 They reported the success of operations and attacks throughout 
the country.  They designed the broadcasts to incite greater hatred of the Tutsi and to spur the 
violence to increase in speed and intensity. In one such broadcast Ruggui said: 
...the population is very vigilant, except in certain 
sectors...where people are still downcast; otherwise, 
everywhere else, they have sacked all the houses, the rooms, 
the kitchens, everywhere! They have even torn out all the doors 
and windows in all the uninhabited houses, [and] in general, 
they find inkotanyi hidden inside. They have searched 
everywhere!...If they [the inkotanyi] get hungry, they’ll all 
come out before you arrive. That is why you must act very fast! 
Force them to come out! Find them at whatever cost.130 
 
A similar broadcast directed interahmwe to watch for Tutsi groups on the move. 
around the hill Mbunabutuso [sic, Mburabuturo], in the 
woods...suspect movements of people have been 
observed...People of Rugonga [sic, Rugunga], of Kanongo [sic, 
Kanogo], by the gas station, pay attention, go to check out that 
woods, go ensure security and that the inyenzi have not gotten 
in there.131 
 
FAR and interahmwe troops utilized these broadcasts to track large groups of Tutsi and other 
targeted individuals throughout the country.  The radio broadcasts allowed the orchestrators 
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to send orders to their agents in the field who may have lacked two-way radios.  Interahmwe 
groups most likely relied on these broadcasts for directions because they likely had regular 
radios where they lacked military ones. 
 Aside from taking direction from broadcasts and direct orders from FAR officers, the 
interahmwe operated on their own.  They targeted large populations of Tutsi, such as towns 
and communities set up during Habyarimana’s forced repopulation efforts during the 
previous decades.  They targeted places where their victims were likely to flee.  The GOR 
tricked and forced Tutsi to go to these safe houses so that it would be easier to kill them.  As 
early as 11 April, government officials began telling refugees and victims that they could 
find protection in designated safe zones.  At times the GOR and FAR forced Tutsi to leave 
their homes and towns to enter these safe zones arguing that GOR would protect them in 
these places.  In the prefectures of Kibuye and Cyangugu, refugees were placed in sports 
stadiums so that the GOR and FAR could keep a close eye on them.  Kivumu, the prefect of 
Kibuye, put a number of Tutsi in the Byange church so that the refugees’ movements could 
be limited.  As would become the pattern, these refugee centers became the sites of 
massacres as FAR and interahmwe used them as convenient killing grounds, forcing Tutsi to 
stay until their killers arrived.132 
Churches, hospitals and schools became sites of massacres.  In the northwest 
prefecture of Gisenyi fifty people were killed while seeking refuge at the Nyundo seminary. 
Forty-three people died at the Church of Busogo and one hundred and fifty lost their loves at 
the Busasamana parish.  East of Gisenyi at the campus of the Seventh Day Adventist 
University in Mudende prefecture saw Burundian students and a group of wounded soldiers 
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kill a group of Tutsi trying to hide there.  In Kigali, the Church of Nyamirambo was the site 
of a massacre on 8 April.  The Mosque at Nyamirambo and the Gikondo Church in Kigali 
were the sites of over one hundred deaths on 9 April.133  At Gikondo Church, police and 
presidential guard corralled Tutsi into the church, took their identity cards, and then left the 
crowd to the machinations of the militia.  The police and presidential guard held a UNAMIR 
contingent of five soldiers at gunpoint when they attempted to interfere and forced them to 
watch the slaughter.  General Dallaire says, “They confronted a scene of unbelievable horror-
the first such scene UNAMIR witnessed- evidence of the genocide, though we didn’t yet 
know to call it that”.134 
Between April 11 and May 1, the worst slaughters of the genocide took place.  St. 
Josephs center in Kibungo, Nyamesheke and Mibirizi churches in Cyangugu, Kibeho, 
Cyanika and Kaduha churches in Gikongoro, Butare hospital at the University in Butare, 
Nyundo Cathedral in Gisenyi, and the ETO school in Kigali were all sites of devastating 
massacres where hundreds of thousands of Tutsi were killed.135 
Among these tragedies many Tutsi found refuge among the arms of the RPF.  RPF 
camps at Kabgay in the Gitarama province saved 24,300 Tutsi.  A number of National Police 
officers disobeyed orders to participate in the genocide and protected Tutsi that found their 
way to them.  At Nyarushishi in the prefecture of Cyangugu Colonel Bavugamenshi of the 
National Police protected roughly ten thousand Tutsi until the French Operation Turquoise 
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relieved them.136  At Butare the prefect refused to follow orders to kill local Tutsi costing 
him his life when FAR and interahmwe took control of Butare.137 
Other Tutsi survived the early days of the killings by fighting back.  At Rubona Hill 
in Butare prefecture and Bisesero in Kibuye prefecture Tutsi fought sieges against Hutu 
attackers.  They hid in the brush and jungle to draw their attackers into ambush.  The 
defenders utilized a tactic known as kwiunga (merging).  They waited for their attackers to 
get close enough so that they could ambush FAR and interahmwe by suddenly appearing 
within the ranks of their attackers.  The Tutsi hoped that engaging their enemies in close 
quarters would prevent the FAR and interahmwe from firing on their own men, giving an 
advantage to the Tutsi who many times fought with farm tools and knives because they 
lacked guns.   
These sieges lasted for weeks with mostly interahmwe surrounding the hills Tutsi hid 
on hoping to starve them out of hiding.  The Tutsi managed to survive by foraging for food 
on the large jungle covered hills.  The Tutsi organized themselves into leadership positions to 
organize defense and feeding efforts.  They planned to retreat further into the forests when 
attacked.  The Tutsi at Bisesero organized and fought so well that their siege lasted from 
April 8 to July 1.  They utilized the steep cliffs of the hills to see approaching interahmwe 
and FAR troops so that they were prepared for the attacks before the attackers arrived.  The 
siege at Bisesero ended on June 20 when FAR soldiers arrived to support National Police 
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surrounding the hills.  The FAR soldiers attacked the hills killing roughly 1,500 Tutsi who 
spent months starving and clinging to life on the hills.138 
A number of Tutsi who did not look Tutsi escaped death by passing as Hutu.  They 
got through roadblocks and checkpoints using forged ID cards.  Those who looked Hutu 
enough escaped death because the killers identified Tutsi through body features, features like 
long thin noses, as much as through their identity cards.139 
Other Tutsi survived by repeatedly running and hiding from FAR and interahmwe 
patrols.  They traveled in small groups to make it more difficult for them to be found and 
they fled to RPF controlled territory and neighboring countries like Tanzania and Zaire.  
These Tutsi survived by hiding from and bribing FAR and interahmwe they encountered.  
They would offer anything of value they might have to pay off their potential killers to let 
them go.  Watches, cash and even sexual favors were favored currency for FAR troops 
looking to profit in some way from the killings.  In some cases, Tutsi took advantage of 
confusion within the ranks of the FAR and interahmwe to escape death.  In two instances, 
young Tutsi women utilized the distraction of soldiers preparing for a massacre to escape.  
Des Forges describes these events as: 
One woman at the crowded Kabgayi camp who was selected 
for killing by militia begged the chance to suckle her infant one 
last time. While she was doing so, her captor got bored and 
looked away and she disappeared into the crowd. A teenaged 
girl was lined up with others waiting to be killed at the edge of 
a grave. When the killers began to dispute the division of the 
spoils taken from the victims, she sped off into the night. 
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These women capitalized on the confusion of forcing Tutsi together for their deaths and the 
disorganized concerns of their attackers to slip out of captivity and save their own lives.140 
As the genocide progressed some in the international community called for a unified 
intervention.  General Dallaire pleaded with the Security Council for an increase in the size 
and mandate of UNAMIR operations.  He wanted permission and resources to set up safe 
zones where UN troops could protect refugee Tutsi and Hutu.  Some in the UN agreed and 
petitioned the Security Council and the UN to stop the killings.  General Dallaire had orders 
to avoid armed confrontations with the fighting sides.  His superiors ordered him to continue 
to work toward a diplomatic solution to the fighting by negotiating with FAR and 
interahmwe leaders to end the killings.  General Dallaire was able to buy time for Tutsi and 
others to escape murder by strategically placing UN peacekeepers in supposed safe zones.  
This prevented some FAR and interahmwe from attacking refugees because reporters often 
accompanied peacekeepers.  Bagosora and his supporters were still concerned about the 
prospects of an international intervention that they did not want the true nature of the 
violence reported in the media.  Many of the killers in the fields felt the same way and 
decided it best to wait until the peacekeepers and reporters left to stage attacks.141 
Despite the calls for intervention, the UN and the Security Council dragged its feet on 
the issue.  Arguments revolved around the nature of the conflict and to what extent the UN 
was required to get involved.  Many within the international organization doubted that an 
increased peacekeeping force would be able to end the killings and restore peace and so 
wanted to find alternative solutions to ending the violence.  The United States, among others, 
continuously stressed the belief that forcing the implementation of the disarmament tenets of 
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the Arusha Accords through negotiation, diplomacy and threat of economic sanctions against 
the GOR would convince Bagosora to withdraw his troops from the field and order the 
interahmwe to stand down.  They then reasoned that if the FAR and militias stopped 
attacking RPF and Tutsi targets that the RPF would halt its advance from the north and the 
two sides could find another diplomatic solution to their problems. 
President Bill Clinton’s administration was initially quiet on the opening round of 
killings because the American public had yet to pressure the government to take action.142  
Many high-ranking members of the State Department thought tensions between the Hutu and 
Tutsi were too old for intervention to stop.  Others in the Clinton administration thought the 
price of intervention required to stop the fighting and killing, in money and soldiers, would 
be higher than the American public would pay.  Secretary of State Warren Christopher told 
Madeline Albright, the American ambassador to the UN, to press for removal of the entire 
UN peacekeeping force in Rwanda.  She argued with Christopher over the phone from the 
UN about how and if they should remove the troops.  She argued him down from removing 
the entire mission to removing ninety percent of the troops.  This reduction would have left 
the mission with four hundred fifty troops to negotiate and enforce a cease-fire between two 
parties intent on fighting out their dispute.143  
President Clinton’s primary objective in regards to the killings in Rwanda was to 
evacuate all American personnel.  Clinton personnel organized a joint US-Belgian-French 
operation to evacuate their respective civilians and few military personnel inside Rwanda.  
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As part of this operation, Belgian officials requested that the United States provide 
equipment and vehicles needed to evacuate their nationals.144 
On April 9, one hundred and ninety French paratroopers took control of the Kigali 
airport to begin Operation Amaryllis.  The French were to hold the airport while French, 
American and Belgian civilians made their way there and then use American military aircraft 
to evacuate the civilians.145 There were 255 Americans in Rwanda when the genocide began.  
They were primarily personnel attached to the US embassy in Kigali and a handful 
representing private business and nongovernmental organizations.  Evacuating American 
civilians was the initial objective of the US government when the killing started.146  
American expatriates gathered at the US embassy in Kigali for evacuation.147  The 
Pentagon organized a force of three hundred marines, stationed off the coast of Somalia at 
the start of the genocide, to evacuate American civilians.  The Marines used a force of four 
KC-130 airborne tankers, three CH-53 troop-carrying helicopters and four Air Force C-141 
transport aircraft to move those evacuees who did not wish to stay in Rwanda.148  Laura Lane 
(an embassy worker in charge of organizing the expatriates for evacuation) wanted to turn the 
embassy into a safe zone to protect as many Rwandans as they could, but George Moose (the 
Assistant Secretary of State for Africa) told her to abandon the idea because the US did not 
have a way of protecting them. 149 
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Carl Wilkens, an aid worker and the only American to stay behind, kept a video diary 
of what he saw.  In one recording, he discovers a group of interahmwe surrounding an 
orphanage.  Wilkens quickly and successfully petitioned the acting Prime Minister to protect 
the orphanage and saved the children.150  Gregory “Gromo” Alex, a UN aid worker remained 
in Kigali to head humanitarian relief operations by delivering food and medical supplies to 
safe zones established inside Kigali.151 
The Clinton administration had lost its will for intervention after the failed mission to 
Somalia three months prior. Eighteen Marines died in a mission to capture faction leaders in 
Mogadishu. The Somalia mission failed in such a horrendous way that the Clinton 
administration reexamined its stance on intervention and decided to take every measure to 
avoid a similar disaster.  It saw intervention in Rwanda, prior to and during the genocide, as a 
risk it was not willing to take, both politically and in American lives.  For the government in 
Washington, Rwanda was one more failed state that would take a great military effort to put 
back together, one it was not willing to take.152 
The Clinton administration took a great deal of criticism for not taking a proactive 
stance on the killings shortly after they started, but the American government was worried 
about repeating the mistakes of the previous year.  The Clinton administration lost much of 
its nerve for intervention in Africa after the deaths of eighteen American Special Forces 
soldiers in Mogadishu the previous October.153  Most members of the administration wanted 
to avoid a repeat of the failure in Somalia despite the rising number of dead.  Despite this, 
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there were those in the administration who wanted to act.  Higher-ranking members of the 
administration were content to leave attempts to help to lower members.  In an interview for 
the PBS documentary, “Ghosts of Rwanda,” Anthony Lake, President Clinton’s National 
Security Advisor, said, “It never became a serious issue for senior levels of the 
administration.  They never really considered the issue of international intervention.”154  
They left the issue in the hands of the bureaucracy.  Prudence Bushnell (Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of State for Africa) led an inter-agency working group seeking an end to the crisis.  
She argued with members of the Pentagon over such issues as jamming radio transmission by 
such stations as Radio Rwanda and Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines that pushed 
anti-Tutsi propaganda and helped direct militias to survivors hiding places.  The Pentagon 
refused, arguing that doing so would violate First Amendment rights of free speech and 
freedom of the press.155  Senior defense officials cautioned that jamming the radio stations 
could be the first move in process that would drag the US into direct military intervention.  
Doing so would directly violate the policy stance and goals of senior members of the 
President’s cabinet, the State Department and the President himself.156 
The US called for a complete withdrawal of UN peacekeepers during a meeting of the 
Security Council.  On April 15, the US declared that the UNAMIR task force no longer had a 
job to do in Rwanda.  The US argued that the task force arrived in Rwanda to observe and 
maintain the cease-fire, since hostilities restarted, the cease-fire had failed and there was no 
longer a reason to keep the task force in country.  On April 21, the UN Security Council 
voted unanimously to remove UNAMIR troops, cutting the UN forces from 2,500 to two 
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hundred seventy.157  The Rwandan government took part in this vote having become a 
nonaligned member of the Security Council shortly before the genocide commenced.158 
General Dallaire disobeyed orders to evacuate his people and attempted to protect as 
many Tutsi and Hutus as he could.  On April 16, he established protection zones at Amahoro 
Stadium, King Faisal Hospital and a number of other locations near Kigali.  At the stadium, 
his limited forces protected roughly fifteen thousand refugees.  At the hospital, he protected 
roughly six thousand refugees.  General Dallaire ordered a contingent of UN peacekeepers to 
protect Hotel Mille Collines in Kigali after witnessing a group of interahamwe constructing 
barricades outside of the hotel.  The interahmwe claimed they were preventing traitors from 
leaving the hotel, but that they would allow anyone to enter.  Dallaire realized the militia 
intended to use the hotel as convenient killing ground and ordered the hotel under UN 
protection.159 
The Clinton administration spoke out several times against the killings while they 
were taking place, but never once referred to them as genocide.  Six weeks into the 
bloodshed, President Clinton made a public statement where he declared that American 
intervention in the future would depend on its effect on US interests in the given situation.  If 
a crisis did not have a large effect on American interests, it would be unlikely that the US 
would intervene.160  On May 20, the State Department issued a secret intelligence report 
referring to the killings as genocide.  The memo urged the US to acknowledge the genocide 
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to preserve American credibility with human rights groups and the public.  The memo argued 
that the US could avoid forced involvement because the 1948 Genocide Convention only 
stipulated the persecution by the courts of persons responsible for genocide.  Because there 
was no tribunal established to confront this issue, and because no US citizen committed acts 
of genocide, the United States would not be legally obligated to intervene, judicially or 
militarily. 161  Despite these considerations, the US refrained from openly acknowledging the 
killings as genocide. 
On April 30, the Security Council publicly condemned the killings, but refrained from 
calling it genocide for the same reasons as the US.162  By not officially declaring the violence 
to be genocide the United States and United Nations were able to buy themselves more time 
to deliberate on the issue of how to approach the violence, what –if anything-they should do 
and how they should go about doing it.  Officially recognizing the violence as genocide 
would force the US and UN to arrest and detain the perpetrators.  The danger lies in 
attempting to arrest the perpetrators. Jared Cohen argued that the Clinton administration 
feared that NGOs and the media would interpret the language of the Genocide Convention in 
such a way that called on direct military intervention.  The specific language of the Genocide 
Convention does not make military intervention a required action, but by openly declaring 
the killings genocide, the door is open for non-government groups to interpret the 
Convention in such a way that would put new pressure on the government to act.163 
The Security Council eventually decided to send aid to Rwanda after several weeks of 
arguments.  On May 17, the UN agreed to a two-stage plan to end the fighting.  The first 
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stage required sending relief efforts and establishing a new cease-fire.  The second stage 
called for sending 5,500 African troops to oversee and enforce the cease-fire.  The new 
mandate authorized creation of safe zones outside of Kigali and protecting humanitarian 
organizations working in the country.  The United States originally agreed to pay one-third of 
the cost to send the new operation to Rwanda.164 
Despite finally making a decision, the US slowed the response of the Security 
Council by raising issues over who was going to pay to supply and transport the 
peacekeepers.  The US originally agreed to the plan on May 13, but the US changed its mind 
about the makeup of the African forces on May 16.  The US argued that it would be better for 
the UN to send eight hundred fifty Ghanaian soldiers supported by one hundred fifty military 
observers to secure the Kigali airport to bring in troops and relief efforts. On May 19, the UN 
asked the US to supply fifty armored personnel carriers for the relief troops.  The US debated 
over who would pay for transporting the vehicles and compensation if they were lost. In the 
end, the US agreed to pay one third of the cost for sending troops to Rwanda. 165 
On June 20, tired of the stalling within the Security Council and seeking to protect its 
position in Africa, France informed the Security Council that France and Senegal were 
preparing to send a military force to Rwanda.  They wanted the operation to gain approval 
under Chapter VII of the UN charter, which would allow the use of military force for the 
maintenance or repair of international peace and security.166  Refugees had been pouring into 
neighboring countries since the first week of the genocide, creating an international crisis for 
the countries bordering Rwanda. 
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Authorized on June 22, 1994, Operation Turquoise made France the first European 
country to make an actual attempt to send help to Rwanda.  UN resolution 929 authorized 
UN member states to use “all necessary means to achieve the humanitarian objectives of 
UNAMIR II.”167  This marked the sixth time that the Security Council authorized the use of 
military force under Chapter VII of the UN charter and the second time it authorized a group 
of member states to use of military force for humanitarian intervention of an internal conflict 
not placed under UN control.168  The mission objective was to deploy French and Senegalese 
troops to southwest Rwanda and create a safe zone in the government-controlled territory.  
The operation deployed to Goma and Bukavu in Zaire because their positions near the border 
with Rwanda made them ideal for moving troops and supplies to operations within Rwanda.  
The mission moved 2,330 French troops and thirty-two Senegalese troops into Rwanda.169 
French Special Forces entered Rwanda on June 23 from American bases set up 
outside the country.  Three thousand French troops established bases and supply chains in 
Zaire while 1,800 entered Rwanda to establish a safe zone and set up logistic positions.  They 
established a safe zone of roughly two thousand square miles (or roughly 20% of Southwest 
Rwanda) and attempted to protect and support a refugee population of roughly 1.5 million. 
Despite difficulties presented by protecting such a large territory with so few troops, French 
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officials claim to have saved thousands of lives.  They estimate that Operation Turquoise 
saved between fifteen and seventeen thousand people from at least three major locations.  
Between eight and ten thousand people survived at the stadium in Cyangugu, one-thousand-
one-hundred at Bisesero (the site of the long running siege), six thousand at Gikongoro.  
French officials claim to have saved one thousand orphans and six hundred religious officials 
from Rwanda, but details are unclear as to where they were evacuated from within the 
country and how many of them were Tutsi.170 
Aside from physically protecting thousands of refugees, Operation Turquoise gave 
the UN and the Security Council its first real look at the anti-Tutsi nature of the genocide.  
France had previously maintained its ties to the GOR and readily believed their claims that 
the violence was not genocide but a revisit of the civil war.  French forces on the ground in 
Rwanda saw the truth of the matter and, for the first time, the French government openly 
acknowledged that the GOR lied to it.  This turned the French government against Bagosora 
and the GOR, even though it was not in favor of the RPF either.  Their reports also led to the 
declaration of a new humanitarian mission to help stop the violence and relieve growing 
humanitarian concerns over the growing number of refugees.171   
Daniela Kroslak argued that the French turned on the GOR after realizing that the 
RPF had made too many military gains.  Pushing the RPF out of the country would have cost 
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the French too much politically and militarily.  The French believed the effectiveness of their 
operation was limited by basing their mission out of Zaire.  After determining these 
limitations, Kroslak argued, the French decided to create “Safe Humanitarian Zones” and 
sever their ties to the GOR.172 
The US wanted to rely on diplomatic pressures on the Hutu government to stop the 
violence.  General Dallaire’s orders were to bring the Hutu leadership and the RPF together 
to negotiate a cease-fire and reach a settlement to end the crisis.  He repeatedly met with 
Bagosora and leaders of the interahmwe to find a way to bring them to the negotiating table.  
He learned that neither Bagosora nor Kagame were willing to negotiate an end to the 
violence.  The war was going to end with one group defeating the other.173 US officials 
within the UN blocked increasing the troops and mandate for UNAMIR because the Clinton 
administration wanted to prevent raising the cost of the mission.  Anthony Lake openly 
doubted that the requested increase in troops would be able to prevent further massacres.174  
Not all parties involved in the genocide were in favor of an UN mission designed to 
end the genocide.  Throughout the UN discussions over intervention, members of the RPF 
expressed concerns that the proposed safe zones would protect perpetrators of the genocide.  
They also feared that it would help Bagosora keep his position.175  There was also concern 
among refugee populations that their attackers would use new safe zones as convenient 
killing grounds in the same way they used Hutu established refugee and protection areas 
early in the killings. 
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At the time of the genocide, GOR represented Rwanda on the Security Council.  
Rwanda received a two-year term on the Security Council during the fortieth session of the 
General Assembly, beginning its term on January 1, 1994. Their position on the Security 
Council was in jeopardy after the start of the genocide because Rule 13 of the Provisional 
Rules of Procedure of the Security Council requires that the representative of the country in 
question have official credentials presented to the Security Council by their head of state or 
Minister of Foreign Affairs.  The interim government of Rwanda established by Bagosora 
and his supporters lacked a recognized head of state.176  The GOR under Habyarimana 
supplied the required credentials to Boutros-Ghali during the previous August, securing 
Rwanda’s place among the Security Council and gaining it the presidency of the Security 
Council throughout December 1994.177  The General Assembly and the Security Council not 
recognizing the interim government as the formal government of Rwanda jeopardized this 
position.  Having their position on the council would have benefitted the GOR in its 
international negotiations and dealings by supplying more credit and influence to the African 
country, but as things progressed; its standing in the international community was on uneven 
ground.  The only reason that this would have concerned Bagosora was that by being on and 
even leading the Security Council in December 1994 the GOR under his leadership would 
have been able to block intervention efforts by voting against them and thus continue his 
campaign for power. 
The media has repeatedly condemned the slow response time of the UN.  An article in 
the World Press Review argued that the UN’s bureaucratic structure slowed down response 
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time hurting military support by increasing the time it takes to make a decisions and by 
member states only offering troops or arms.178 
The genocide finally ended when the RPF took control of Kigali and drove 
Government forces and interahmwe out of the country.  In mid July, RPF forces fought their 
way to Kigali and drove the government forces from the capital.  Two million refugees fled 
the RPF through the French safe zones fearing Tutsi revenge.179  International action failed to 
end the murder of nearly one million people.  The RPA ended the fighting by driving the 
FAR and the Hutu extremists from Rwanda.  Their victory provided a temporary relief from 
Hutu led killings as FAR and GOR remnants began a guerilla war of their own from refugee 
camps in neighboring countries. 
The RPA victory secured the RPF control of the Rwandan government bringing with 
it a new set of military and diplomatic problems.  Distrust and hatred for the UN’s inaction 
put a cloud over Rwandan-UN relations for several years to come.  The UN attempted to 
repair its damaged reputation and diplomatic influence with relief and humanitarian missions. 
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             Chapter Four 
         What were we thinking? 
  American intervention policy and failure to act in Rwanda 
 Politicians, scholars, members of the media and regular people have questioned 
President Clinton’s refusal to intervene during the genocide in Rwanda. The debate is often 
lost amid argument over whether or not the United States could have stopped the killing.  
The media has argued that the United States and the United Nations could have stopped the 
Rwandan genocide if it reinforced UNAMIR with combat ready troops.  Scholars continue to 
argue the exact role the US played during the genocide with some arguing that the US 
refused to act out of a belief that the killings would allow the US to gain greater control of 
sub-Saharan Africa.  It appears that the debate has overshadowed any study of the exact 
timing of US policy in accordance with American policy in sub-Saharan Africa and the 
world.  The purpose of this chapter is to do just that.  The research has shown that the 
American decision to stay away from the genocide was not one made lightly.  A series of 
policy changes begun before the horrific event were influenced by American 
misunderstandings of the conflict and American hesitance to enter another conflict in Africa.  
These misconceptions and fears influenced a carefully thought out policy debate to rapidly 
end in the face of a new and unforeseen crisis.  
 The Cold War ended in 1991 and the United States stood as the victor.  This role 
brought with it a mandate and belief that the US needed to guide the development of the 
hundreds of countries freed from Soviet domination.  American policy makers needed to 
determine the best way to facilitate the democratization of dozens of countries in Eastern 
Europe and to prevent the spread of civil war.  The power vacuum created by the fall of the 
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Soviet Union created many opportunities for power hungry dictators and desperate rebel 
factions to fight for control of their countries.  The US was concerned with the spread of civil 
war because a civil war in one country could easily destabilize its neighbors and undo 
months and years of democratic development.   
 Coming into office on the heels of President Ronald Reagan, President George H.W. 
Bush (Bush 41) had seen firsthand the dangers of unilateral military intervention.  The 
failures of Panama, Granada and the bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut convinced 
policy makers that unilateral military operations were not the way to approach foreign policy.  
They endangered American lives and dragged presidential administrations into political 
quagmires that could devastate foreign policy.  President Reagan’s Secretary of Defense, 
Casper Weinberger, created a new policy for American leaders to follow.  The Weinberger 
Doctrine created six tests for a situation to face when the president considered military 
action.  Weinberger argued that the President needed to consider: 
1) vital interests must be at stake, 2) overwhelming force should be 
used as as to ensure victory; 3) objectives, both political and military, 
must be clear; 4) proper resources must be made available, and if the 
situation on the ground changes, the force structure must be adapted; 
5) before troops were deployed, there must be bipartisan support from 
Congress and from the American people; and 6) the use of armed force 
should be the last resort. 
 
These tests, similar to those used later by President William Clinton, did not apply to UN 
peacekeeping missions because American policy makers did not consider them a viable 
option at the time.  The nature of the Cold War world prevented the superpowers from 
militarily participating in such operations for fear of starting a nuclear war.  The Weinberger 
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Doctrine dealt solely with unilateral missions, and worked to decrease the number of such 
missions the US would undertake.180 
President Bush 41 abided by the altered view on the importance of multilateral 
operations and agreed to support UN peacekeeping operations in the future.  The success of 
Operation Desert Storm convinced Bush 41 that the UN could take the lead in creating a new 
world order.181 
Somalia changed Bush 41’s position on the UN.  Shortly after the approving the 
operation’s mandate, Secretary General Boutros-Ghali asked President Bush to engage in a 
greater scope of activities.  The original mandate for the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) was 
to provide a safe environment for aid workers to distribute food and medical supplies.  
Somalia was in the midst of a civil war where tribal militias fought for control of the country 
following President Said Barre’s removal from power.  Casualties and war damage increased 
after a drought devastated the country’s already fragile agricultural economy in 1992.  The 
chaotic conditions throughout the country prevented aid workers from distributing 
emergency food rations to the dying, as they were prey for militias. Boutros-Ghali wanted 
American troops to disarm the militias and aid UN peacekeepers in removing landmines.  He 
argued that orchestrating the stable outcome to the war would provide the best environment 
for aid workers to distribute needed goods.  President Bush 41 resisted these changes arguing 
that it was not America’s place to undertake state building through military intervention.  The 
conflict over UNITAF’s mandate inspired Bush 41 to revising policy so that the US could 
                                                          
180Michael MacKinnon, The Evolution of US Peacekeeping Policy under Clinton: a fair-weather friend? P.13. 
(MacKinnon) 
181MacKinnon p. 13 and 14. 
70 
 
avoid forced assistance for UN peacekeeping missions that risked trapping American troops 
in a quagmire.182   
For these policy changes, President Bush 41 argued that the United States would no 
longer be able to support United Nations interventions and peacekeeping missions in the 
same ways that it had in the past.  He argued that the number of possible interventions the 
UN would engage in was increasing with the end of the Cold War.  The UN previously only 
engaged in peacekeeping and intervention operations that did not risk American-Soviet 
conflict.  The fall of the Soviet Union opened the door for an increased number of UN 
operations. 
President Bush 41 recommended that American policy needed to alter to match the 
growing number of conflicts and difficulties in the post Cold War world.  Bush 41 
recommended a change to preventing destabilization instead of intervention.  The United 
States would be better able to aid countries through preventative measures than intervention.  
Prevention allowed the US to spread its resources further across the globe without fear of 
threats to its interests and people.  Prevention also allowed American policy makers greater 
mobility in determining which states deserved priority.  The greater spread of resources 
would allow the US to assist more states and reduce the need of determining priority.  Policy 
makers had growing concern over which countries would receive priority assistance and 
prevention would make this easier. 
The former Eastern Bloc was undergoing great political changes.  Democratic 
regimes rapidly replaced former satellite governments and promised freedom and equality for 
all.  Countries once held together by Soviet Union puppet governments broke apart as ethnic 
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groups and polities once forced to live together fought to create their own countries.  At the 
same time the Eastern Bloc was undergoing a political restructuring, a number of African 
states formerly loyal to the Soviet Union faced the same problems.  Former dictators 
supported by the Soviet Union found themselves without Soviet power backing their rule and 
ten formerly one-party states transitioned to democratically elected multi-party states.183 
The US and Soviet Union never saw Rwanda as a priority.  They directed their 
strategic thinking to countries that presented tactical advantage in the event of a nuclear war, 
or those with important resources. After the end of the Cold War, the US directed new 
attention to promoting regional stability.  The Rwandan civil war presented such a threat to 
the stability of the Great Lakes Region of Africa because of the refugee flows and RPF ties to 
Uganda.  The growing dangers of the Rwandan civil war and the democratization of much of 
Africa brought up new concerns for the development of Sub-Saharan Africa. President Bush 
41 addressed the concerns over Rwanda by wrapping them into his general policy on Sub-
Saharan Africa.   
President Bush 41 argued in National Security Review 30 (NSR 30) that sub-Saharan 
Africa declined in strategic importance after the end of the Cold War and Operation Desert 
Storm.184  This is no surprise as the US no longer countered every expansion of Soviet 
influence into the region and the war with Iraq signaled a change in regionally strategic 
thinking.  Operation Desert Storm, along with terrorist threats from Libya and the conflict 
between Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization, shifted American regional 
concerns to the Middle East while the reorganization of the former Soviet Union shifted 
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further attention to Eastern Europe.  In light of the decline of the region’s already limited 
strategic importance, Bush 41 limited the prospect of intervention in the region and stressed 
the use of preventative measures to protect American and humanitarian interests. 
President Bush 41 wanted to increase relations between the American private sector 
and African private sector to develop African economies.  Private sector development would 
eliminate dependence on foreign loans, better facilitate democratization and improve the 
standard of living for all citizens.  Since democratization has a better chance at success in 
countries with stable economies, building a stronger private sector and cutting dependency 
on foreign loans would lower the risk that a democratic regime would fail under pressure 
from its people. 
President Bush 41 targeted the use of foreign loans from organizations like the World 
Bank by corrupt governments to line their own pockets and to pay for the loyalty of 
supporters within the military.  He planned to combat the support networks of such leaders 
by tying the amount of economic assistance to military spending.185  This would limit the 
capital corrupt leaders would have with which to pay off military officers for continued 
support of their regimes.  This policy is directly relevant to the Habyarimana regime as his 
position as head of the government relied on keeping military supporters happy with him.  
This would allow him to keep high-ranking officers from seeking his replacement and direct 
the military against the RPF throughout the civil war.  
Stabilizing economies and limiting the weapons dictators had to hold onto power 
would strengthen the democratization throughout the region.  This is a continuation of 
American Cold War policy of countering the spread of Soviet Communism by spreading 
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democratic government to neighboring states.  Since the end of the Cold War, the US no 
longer faced the same urgency to spread democracy.  Due to this lack of urgency, the US 
could take covert and overt military intervention off the table and rely on other methods to 
stabilize a region and protect American interests. 
 President Bush 41 addressed the debate over American support for intervention in 
National Security Direct 74 (NSD 74).  NSD 74 began US policy turning away from active 
military intervention in the affairs of other states.  Within the directive, President Bush 41 
established that:  
The United States policy on the UN’s mobilizing national 
forces is that they should be made available only after the 
request of the United Nations Security Council and with the 
approval of the states providing them.  United Nations member 
states must retain the final decision on the use of their troops. 
186
 
 
 President Bush 41 set up American policy so the US would continue to support UN 
missions while allowing the US to bow out of a mission without losing credibility by putting 
the final decision to support a mission in the hands of the state supplying the troops.  The 
policy suggests that the US would not begrudge any UN member state from denying the call 
for assistance and so the US should have the same courtesy. 
 President Bush 41 defined the nature of American support for peacekeeping missions 
in NSD 74.  He directed the US to play a supporting role for future missions by offering its 
considerable logistic capabilities-through transporting troops, providing supplies, intelligence 
and medical personnel- and through training foreign military personnel.187   
In section six of NSD 74, President Bush 41 argued that:  
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…the United States should propose that member states 
provide the United Nations on a regularly updated basis with 
information about the equipment they would in principle be 
willing to provide to equip other nations’ contingents, subject 
to case-by-case national review.  The United States should state 
its willingness to provide such information and should prepare 
a submission.188 
 
This section held that the US would continue to honor agreements to provide 
information on American capabilities that it “would in principle be willing to provide”.189  
This clause granted the US more room to maneuver and greater opportunity to avoid getting 
involved in a mission because it applied these terms to all UN member states. 
National Security Directive 75 (NSD 75) issued December 23, 1992, dealt directly 
with sub-Saharan Africa.  President Bush 41 recognized the changing and troubled nature of 
the region in a post Cold War world and that more and more countries would turn to the US 
for economic and diplomatic support.  President Bush issued that, in light of the benefits the 
US would obtain from a continued presence in the region the US would: 
Continue to promote peaceful change, political stability, 
conflict resolution, democracy, improved governance, more 
commerce, sustainable development, and solutions for 
transnational issues.  To achieve these goals we will maintain 
an appropriate and active diplomatic presence in each 
country.190 
 
 The introduction to NSD 75 argued for prevention over intervention and diplomacy 
over military force.  Development of good governance and economy could prevent the 
creation of threats to American interests. 
 President Bush 41 stated that the primary objective of American involvement in the 
region was promoting stability through conflict resolution.  He further stated that the US 
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needed to operate only within the limits of our own resources and in conjunction with states 
affected by the troubled region.191  America would develop economic and diplomatic ties 
only with regimes “that are committed to political and economic freedoms” to ensure the 
greater stability of troubled regions and the greater security of American interests therein.192 
 Under NSD 75, President Bush 41 established that America would limit its military 
involvement in sub-Saharan Africa.  He stated that: 
…we should engage militarily only under extraordinary, 
compelling circumstances.  Instead we must rely on well-
informed and vigorous bilateral diplomacy, and multilateral 
engagement to preempt and mediate strife.193 
 
President Bush 41 created an extremely limited role of America in military intervention 
while maintaining a commitment to creating stability through multilateral operations and 
diplomacy.  President Bush 41 acknowledged America’s dwindling resource base for 
operations of that kind and proposed that the US work in accordance with other states with 
growing interests in the region and with the UN.  He also argued that, “Collective 
engagement among Africans for peacekeeping and economic development should be both a 
goal of US policy and a modality for pursuing our interests.”194  This was the first instance 
where President Bush 41 directly tied prevention as a goal and as a way of pursuing other 
interests.  By pushing preventative measures, the US would be better able to promote 
democratization throughout the region. 
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He stressed the use of diplomatic and economic incentives to protect American 
interests in sub-Saharan Africa, but did state that the US is willing to use military force to 
protect American citizens in the region.  He further stated the only military interest the US 
has in the region is the protection of American citizens.195  Those military interactions we do 
have were to be limited to fostering better relations through assisting in training programs for 
local militaries and US training exercises to better prepare American troops for possible 
operations in the region.196 
 Much like NSR 30, NSD 75 argued for economic development as a means of 
protecting American interests.  President Bush 41 argued that promoting economic stability 
through instituting free market principles would lower the cost to the US of intervention by 
preventing civil conflict and humanitarian crisis. Governments would receive economic aid 
based on their commitment to democratic and free market principles.  This would allow the 
US to disrupt corrupt governments and increase regional stability by targeting the wallets of 
dictators and corrupt regimes that relied on international aid to finance their regimes.  
President Bush 41 stated that only those countries that had the best prospects of helping the 
US achieve its objectives would have priority to receive American aid.197 
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 President William Jefferson Clinton continued the intervention debate when he 
entered office in 1993.  The fallout from the Somalia operation forced President Clinton to 
increase efforts to analyze and redefine American peacekeeping policy.  The specter of 
Somalia shaped President Clinton’s policy on American cooperation in UN peacekeeping 
missions.  He redesigned American policy to give the US greater ability to avoid direct 
assistance of peacekeeping missions through adding increasingly rigorous standards on 
participation. 
 Presidential Decision Direct 25 (PDD-25), issued by President Clinton on May 6, 
1994, details President Clinton’s intervention policy.  Through PDD-25, President Clinton 
established that America would not support a UN peacekeeping operation, especially one 
they expected to involve American combat personnel, unless the UN made changes to its 
peacekeeping process.  These reforms targeted financing and administration of peacekeeping 
operations.  President Clinton argued that they needed to streamline the administration to 
eliminate redundancies and drains on resources.  Increasing the efficiency of operational 
administration, starting at the top most levels of the UN Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations (DPKO), would increase their success rate, decrease the threat to American 
combat personnel and reduce the cost of peacekeeping operations.198 
 President Clinton acknowledged that peacekeeping operations could be a tool to 
prevent civil and regional conflicts from becoming direct threats to American interests.  Like 
President Bush 41 before him, President Clinton argued that the promotion of democracy, 
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economic growth and security could support US interests, which peacekeeping operations 
would achieve.199  After acknowledging the potential benefits of peacekeeping operations, 
President Clinton proposed a number of changes designed to increase their success rate. 
 President Clinton targeted six issues within existing peacekeeping operations that 
needed change if America was going to support future missions.  PDD-25 stated that the UN 
needed to make the involvement in operations more selective, reduce the financial 
contribution of the US to operations, allow the US to maintain command of all American 
combat troops taking part in an operation, and improve management of all operations.  
President Clinton argued that the United States needed to adopt a position of shared 
responsibility between the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Department of the State 
(State) for financing American involvement in operations and increase cooperation between 
“the Executive, Congress and the American public on peace operations”.200 
 These criteria came at the end of years of debate over the American role in UN 
peacekeeping missions.  The debate gained new strength during the summer and fall of 1993 
as Operation Restore Hope faced problems of increasing violence and famine in Somalia.  
The increased violence in Somalia earned a harsh backlash from Congress and the American 
public, who did not want to put American lives at risk on UN peacekeeping and state 
building missions.201  The ultimate failure of Operation Restore Hope served as a killing 
blow for American support to UN peacekeeping and intervention missions.  President 
Clinton was unwilling and unable to face further public and political backlash for 
endangering American lives on missions that did not support American interests.  Further 
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damage to his administration’s credibility would damage his domestic, economic reforms.  
The genocide in Rwanda forced President Clinton to make a final ruling on how the US 
would deal with calls for help from the UN. 
 President Clinton designed PDD-25 to give the US greater opportunity to deny help 
to UN peacekeeping missions while allowing the US, at least on some level, to maintain face.  
The US would continue to honor a degree of commitment to UN missions, but it would not 
provide material support until the UN made the required changes.  President Clinton cites 
problems with financing missions as one of the two primary problems with the current state 
of UN missions.  He dictated that the percentage of the cost of a mission that the US is 
responsible for fronting needed reduction from 31.7% to 25% and stated that Congress is 
likely to deny funding for operations above 25%.202  This is keeping with policy concerns 
outlined by President Bush 41 in calling for reducing the cost to the US of supporting 
peacekeeping operations.  PDD-25 continues to search for lower costs by defining specific 
areas of operations costs that need reformed to lower costs.   
 Throughout section III of PDD-25, President Clinton argued for the establishment of 
an independent office of Inspector General to provide better oversight for peacekeeping 
operations.  This office would oversee a unified operations budget from which all 
peacekeeping operations will draw their financing.  The first point of financial reform that 
most benefited the United States’ goal of reducing cost, were the formation of a “cadre of 
budget experts from member states, particularly top contributing companies, to assist the UN 
in developing credible budgets and financial plans”.203  The second point prohibited the UN 
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from using money from standing peacekeeping funds for use in budget gaps for general UN 
operations.204 
 The first point granted the United States, as one of the chief contributors, greater 
control over the standing peacekeeping budget.  The US would be able to make budget 
suggestions to the UN by virtue of its position as a chief contributor to the peacekeeping fund 
and subsequently a member of the finance cadre.  The second point protected peacekeeping 
funds from consumption by other parts of the UN.  President Clinton continuously referred to 
problems of peacekeeping administration and this point extended those problems out to the 
general UN.  As other UN, departments and offices took peacekeeping financial assets to fill 
gaps in their own budgets peacekeeping operations suffered from a drain of general 
resources.  This forced member states contributing to the peacekeeping budget to replace the 
missing resources and in turn increased their cost of assistance.  Preventing the redistribution 
of peacekeeping funds to other functions would then lower the cost to the US and keep with 
American peacekeeping policy outlined in PDD-25. 
 President Clinton placed command over American troops at the center of his policy 
changes in PDD-25.  He argued that American military personnel have operated in 
conjunction with international operations dating back to 1948, but that no American troops 
would be subject to the command of foreign officers.  He cited constitutional provisions of 
the President being supreme commander and chief over American Armed Forces as 
reasoning for this and argued that to allow foreign personnel command American combat 
troops would violate the constitution.205 
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 President Clinton made a point of defining the difference between operational control 
and operational command.  For President Clinton command “constitutes the authority to 
issue orders covering every aspect of military operations and administration”.206  He stated 
that operational control was “a subset of command.  It gives for a specific time frame or 
mission and includes the authority to assign tasks to US forces already deployed by the 
President, and assign tasks to US units led by US officers”.207  It is important to note that 
these definitions allowed American troops to take part in peacekeeping operations under the 
direction of non-US personnel while not relinquishing the President’s positions as 
Commander and Chief.  It also granted the US a way out of any possible peacekeeping 
operation if US troops would be under the command of foreign officers.   
 This clause is pertinent to the situation in Rwanda because it gave the US a legitimate 
policy position to negotiate from over the set up of possible intervention missions.  President 
Clinton could, and did, refuse American aid in the form of troops, to any operation that 
would involve combat and have American troops under the command of non-American 
officers.  As Rwanda became an increasingly dire issue, President Clinton sought ways to 
avoid committing American troops to possible intervention operations.  The points within 
PDD-25 strongly suggest that President Clinton created PDD-25 with Rwanda in mind.  His 
administration had weathered harsh reprisals for the failure of Operation Restore Hope and 
did not want to risk a similar outcome in Rwanda.   
 American inaction in Rwanda brings with it questions about why the US refused to 
act.  Answering these questions is a maze of understanding American policy positions and 
intelligence.  To understand the administration’s final decision it is important to understand 
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what they knew about the violence in Rwanda and how they perceived that information.
 There is much debate over what the international community knew about the 
genocide.  While some claim that the nature of the killings was clear from the start, many 
scholars and former policy makers argue that things were not that clear.  Initial understanding 
of the conflict was that it was a renewal of the civil war.  The RPF retaliatory invasion and 
the movement of RPA forces inside Kigali shortly after the killing started certainly supported 
this belief as it appeared the FAR and RPF were targeting one another.  Political 
assassinations perpetrated by the FAR and RPF further supported the misconception that 
Rwanda was revisiting its civil war.208   
 General Dallaire argued that UNAMIR administration was plagued with 
communication issues because of the composition of its forces.  In his book, Shake Hands 
with the Devil, General Dallaire argued that the UNAMIR operation had few administrative 
personnel that spoke the same language as the peacekeeping troops.  Internal communication 
problems caused communication problems with the UN.  Gathering intelligence on the 
course of the genocide took time and energy that was sparse to begin with. Added to the 
complication that few members of the mission could communicate between detachments and 
with the UN, administration in New York City and matters were further complicated.  
General Dallaire argued that UNAMIR was plagued with communication issues stemming 
from administrative red tape prior to the genocide.  The administrative gridlock made 
requisitioning equipment as basic as food, clothing and gas for transportation nearly 
impossible.  General Dallaire argued that the constant battle with UN administration in New 
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York City and his administrative personnel hindered UNAMIR’s mission by depriving it of 
needed equipment and approvals for operations from UN headquarters.209 
 The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) gathered misleading reports about the nature 
of the fighting throughout the first weeks.  The DIA’s ability to gather accurate intelligence 
was limited because of a lack of operatives in the Great Lakes region.  The US had only one 
intelligence agent operating in the region, the defense attaché deployed to Cameroon.  It was 
fortunate for the DIA that the defense attaché was in Rwanda at the start of the genocide, but 
his work centered on determining the threat level posed to American nationals and how best 
to evacuate them.210 
 Inaccurate reports hampered the decision making process for sending an intervention.  
Initial reports indicated that the fighting was on the wane after only a few weeks and that 
calm was spreading throughout Kigali.  The inability of groups like the Red Cross to gather 
accurate information led to early casualty reports to be grossly underestimated.  These reports 
exclusively focused on the fighting in Kigali excluding the outer regions.  The first call of 
genocide did not emerge until the end of the second week of the killings.211  False reports 
spread by the RPF and FAR compounded problems generated by faulty reporting.  The RPF 
wanted to gain support from FAR and government moderates while the Hutu extremists 
wanted to hide the genocide so they could continue it.212 
 The chaos inside Rwanda and lack of a strong intelligence network within Rwanda 
increased the difficulty in accurate reporting.  There were concerns that the DIA possessed an 
RPF bias because the organizations were close.  The DIA refused to reveal its sources 
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making it impossible to determine their validity.  The DIA also refused to reveal its methods 
for gathering intelligence, citing government regulations, causing further problems in 
determining the validity of reports.  This led to skepticism over casualty estimates among 
other American and international agencies.213  The Red Cross was the only humanitarian 
organization to remain in Rwanda during the genocide.  It maintained its operations despite 
attempts by FAR to hinder it.  Red Cross workers formed a network of aid stations that 
provided estimates on the number of injured and killed throughout the genocide.  The Red 
Cross estimated 300,000 killed in the first four weeks of the genocide.  The accuracy of their 
reports was subject to what they could witness at their stations, but they were the only 
estimates coming out of Rwanda not tied to one of the combatants.214 
 Jared Cohen argued that President Clinton did not know enough about Rwanda 
outside of the genocide to ask the right questions about the crisis.  President Clinton knew 
little about the region and country because he was not an African expert.  He was a domestic 
president, placing stabilizing the economy and creating a national health care plan at the 
forefront of his presidency.  Foreign policy, particularly for sub-Saharan Africa, occupied a 
backseat to his concerns despite the monumental task of dealing with the end of the Cold 
War.  His limited understanding of Rwanda and African conflicts led President Clinton to 
believe the only way to end the killing, or any ethnic conflict in Africa, was through extended 
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military intervention, a course of action that the American people and principle policy 
makers in the government refused to take.215 
 Coupled with the confusion over what was going on was a lack of a widespread call 
for intervention among Americans.  The American people did not pressure President Clinton 
because, like many in his administration, they did not want to go through another Somalia.216  
This is due to a number of reasons.  The first is that there was little reporting on the genocide 
in the American media because the American media was as misled to what was going on as 
the government was.  What little coverage Rwanda did receive focused on determining the 
cause of the conflict but not the nature of it.  Professor Deo Nsavyimana, of the University of 
Burundi, commented in the June 1994 edition of the World Press Review that ethnic-based 
political parties competing for control caused Rwanda’s troubles.  The ethnic nature of the 
parties unbalances them and makes democratization impossible.  Professor Nsavyimana 
argued that the only way “to ensure peace and stability is through repeated action by the 
government dedicated to justice and human rights, not through speeches” and to have “an 
elected president balanced by a representative assembly”.217 
 Cohen argued that American media was focused on the same international issues that 
dominated President Clinton’s administration and on sensational domestic stories like the 
deaths of former President Richard Nixon and Jackie Onassis.  Even the arrest of O.J. 
Simpson garnered more press time then the attempted destruction of an entire people.  Cohen 
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argued that “African coverage has been historically less appealing to media organizations 
unless the particular crisis involves western expatriates, diplomats, or floods of refugees”.218 
 Despite the fact that each of these criteria have a place in the Rwandan story, the 
media focused on other stories they thought more appealing to their viewers.  Initial reporting 
on Rwanda focused on the rising body count, sacrificing op-ed pieces by African experts –
like Alison Des Forges- for sensational pictures and footage of corpses.  The media ignored 
the, politically, more pressing concern over the government forces driving the genocide.  
Fitting with Brunk’s arguments of the African schema, media organizations portrayed the 
genocide as another ethnically charged civil war that was stereotypical of Africa.219   
 Cohen argued accurately about the lack of on the ground reporting.  Contemporary 
research has found very few stories about the genocide written at the time of the killings, as 
the reporting at the time focused on other issues.  What limited reporting on Rwanda there 
was is limited to small articles about the start of the violence and small speculation about the 
death toll.  Deeper analysis and attempts to understand the nature of the genocide did not 
surface in the media until after the killing ended. 
 There was little call for action from Congress.  Congress shared President Clinton’s 
aversion to intervention, and for the same reasons.  Anthony Lake later commented that 
neither Congress nor the president wanted to risk starting a trend of involvement in ethnic 
conflicts that would force the US to intervene in future ethnic conflicts.  The war in Bosnia 
was chief in their minds as they considered their options for Rwanda.  If the US utilized a 
large ground force to stop the killing in Rwanda they would be expected to do the same in 
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Bosnia.  Congress allowed the NGOs closest to the crisis to lead the call for action.  The only 
NGO to call for strong, military intervention was Human Rights Watch, while the others 
called for the US to take diplomatic measures to end the killing.  Jamming Rwandan 
commercial radio signals was the extreme action requested by the NGOs.220 
 It is necessary to understand the changes started under NSR 30, NSD 74 and 75, and 
culminated in PDD-25 to understand why the United States did not intervene in Rwanda.  
Presidents Bush 41 and Clinton initiated policy changes in response to international events.  
Bush 41 faced a changing landscape that required the US to play a greater role in directing 
the development of newly formed and freed nations.  President Clinton continued the 
operations started by Bush 41, and as such received much of the credit for their success and 
failure.  The failure of Operation Restore Hope in Somalia influenced Clinton to finish policy 
changes started by Bush 41.  Citing similar reasons as Bush 41; administrative troubles in the 
UN, reducing the cost in men and resources, President Clinton designed American 
intervention policy to allow him and succeeding presidents to hesitate on joining missions.  
Bush 41 committed American combat personnel to the Somalia operation under previous 
agreements to aid UN operations.  Clinton wanted to prevent standing policy forcing the US 
to commit troops to future operations.   
When the US did finally agree to an operation, American representatives to the UN 
began heated negotiations over reimbursement of American supplies and transpiration.  
These negotiations fit with PDD-25 policy about reimbursement. Using this policy, the US 
would not commit its logistics capabilities until it secured reimbursement for its supplies and 
transportation costs.  American officials followed this stance as a means of reducing 
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American costs for supporting peacekeeping missions and as a way of keeping the US out of 
the proposed intervention. 
 The joint French-Belgian-American operation to evacuate respective nationals 
functioned under ideas of operational control.  Each military detachment operated within its 
own chain of command while combining their independent operations for greater success.  
The French troops held the Kigali airport while American, Belgian, and French personnel 
secured the evacuation of their nationals through it.  PDD-25 allowed this operation because 
it did not put American combat personnel under the command of foreign personnel.  
American soldiers may have submitted to the operational control of Belgian officers for use 
of the Kigali airport, but they did not take orders from the Belgians. 
Taking the opinions of American policy makers in conjunction with policy decisions 
made by President Clinton it is clear that US personnel did not want to get involved in 
Rwanda.  Scholars have argued that Clinton and his subordinates wanted to avoid another 
Somalia.  Clinton’s administration was shaken by the failure of the mission and the American 
people refused to see their soldiers killed over a conflict in a country they knew nor cared 
nothing about.   The majority of Americans knew of and cared little for Rwanda before 
headlines and prime time news carried stories of a rampaging army ethnically cleansing a 
country.   
 Darren Brunk argued in his article, Curing the Somalia Syndrome: Analogy, Foreign 
Policy Decision Making, and the Rwandan Genocide, that the specter of Somalia covered the 
Rwandan genocide because American policy makers viewed its events through the African 
schema.  The African schema forced a view that all African conflicts were tribal conflicts 
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pitting ethnic groups against one another in unending wars for supremacy, making any 
intervention inherently unwinnable.221   
 Brunk argued that American policy makers viewed Rwanda through this schema and 
by doing so drew false similarities between Rwanda and Somalia.  Policy makers saw 
Rwanda as a hopeless cause because it was an African conflict and it had several similarities 
with Somalia.  Both conflicts revolved around civil wars that pitted rebel groups against a 
recognized government.  Agricultural and economic devastation characterized both conflicts.  
A drought that killed crops leading to famine and economic turmoil spurred on the Somali 
Civil War.  A drop in worldwide coffee prices, which drained money from the economy and 
cost thousands of workers their jobs, had spurred on the Rwandan Civil War.  In both 
conflicts, authoritarian rulers attempted to maintain their position through bribing important 
officials and manipulating tribal and ethnic histories to gain support for their positions.  Both 
conflicts drew their countries into chaos putting the noncombatant populace in great 
danger.222   
Both Brunk and Alan Kuperman argued that American policy makers made these 
connections but failed to see the important differences between the two cases.  Somalia was a 
war torn country facing famine and political instability created by multiple warring factions.  
Rwanda in 1994 was not a country torn by civil war, but one marred by a government 
orchestrated genocide.  The combatants in Somalia were willing to fight international 
peacekeepers but Rwandan combatants were not.  RPF and FAR soldiers maneuvered around 
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French soldiers participating in Operation Turquoise.  The RPF engaged French soldiers on 
rare occasions, and each time quickly withdrew. 
 American policy makers would have seen Rwanda in a different light if they had 
recognized these differences.  Rwanda would have appeared as a winnable situation because 
the combatants were not willing to engage foreign troops.  A large UN force would have 
been able to create safe zones to prevent further killing.  Operation Turquoise lends credence 
to this case.  FAR and RPF were hesitant to engage one another or their victims when near 
French troops.  Refugees who made it to the safe zones were safe from the militias’ machetes 
because they did not want to fight foreign troops.  The success of France’s unilateral mission 
supports the idea that a larger mission composed of multiple states would have achieved 
similar success over a larger area. Administrative conflicts are the most likely problems that 
could have prevented the success of a larger military mission as it would have hindered troop 
movements and on the spot decision-making.  The other possible hindrance to a larger 
mission would have been the intervention by other African states, though this was unlikely 
because ending the genocide was in the best interests of Rwanda’s neighbors. 
 It becomes clear why many policy makers believed the Rwandan crisis was similar to 
other African crises when we examine the history of the conflict.  The genocide’s origins lie 
in Rwanda’s colonization a century earlier as European racism and cultural misunderstanding 
set the groundwork for the ethnic conflict that erupted in the Hutu revolution and later in the 
RPF invasion of 1991.  The long running conflict was distinctly ethnic based, through very 
real discrepancies in the distribution of wealth and opportunities between Hutu and Tutsi 
within Rwanda and through the propaganda used to spur the country’s population to mass 
murder.  As implementation of the Arusha Accords failed and the genocide commenced, 
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American policy makers, particularly those with little interest in East Africa, increasingly 
viewed the situation through a schema that told them the fighting would never end. 
 Brunk’s argument is accurate when taken in collusion with three other points, the 
ongoing change to American intervention policy, the lack of public outcry for intervention, 
and the fact that Rwanda was not a priority for the Clinton administration.  These four points 
only explain part of why the United States refused to act in Rwanda.  Together, they give a 
complete picture of what President Clinton and policy makers were thinking when they 
decided not to join the UN in stopping the genocide. 
 Brunk’s argument provided a lens for policy makers to view the Rwanda crisis 
through and try to understand it.  They were in the midst of the political fallout from Somalia 
and reassessing America’s intervention policy, both of which had drastic affects on the role 
policy makers saw for the US in the future.  Arguments started by President Bush 41 found 
new footing in the Clinton administration as policy makers faced what they perceived to be 
another Somalia, a high cost operation likely to fail in the light of age-old ethnic tension.  
The lack of a large public outcry for intervention, encouraged through the lack of press 
coverage of any kind during the genocide, allowed policy makers to deny military assistance 
without facing further domestic political backlash. 
 Rwanda was not an American priority in 1994.  The State Department focused on 
problems in Eastern Europe like the breakup of Yugoslavia and the Israel-Palestine 
conflict.223  They did not consider sub-Saharan Africa a priority prior to the genocide because 
larger world events that directly affected the United States overshadowed it.  Not being a 
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priority meant that there were few American interests in Rwanda that needed protection 
when the genocide began.  They quickly evacuated the few American nationals in the 
country at the start of the genocide through the joint American-French-Belgian mission.  The 
only interest left for the US was humanitarian and preventing damage that the failure to act 
would do to America’s international advantage.  It is not surprising that President Clinton 
weighed the preservation of American lives, and subsequently his administration’s public 
support, over the lives of nearly one million Tutsi and Hutu.  President Clinton’s two terms in 
office were marked with domestic developments and interests.  He held few international 
interests outside of Eastern Europe and the Middle East. 
 The United States failed to act in Rwanda because President Clinton and his staff did 
not see Rwanda as a priority state, were not pressured by their constituency to act, and 
because they had already turned away from intervention in sub-Saharan Africa, a region they 
saw as hopelessly caught up in ages old ethnic conflicts.  The preservation of life was their 
only incentive to act.  International organizations like the Red Cross and UN were the only 
source of pressure on the US to intervene. 
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                             Conclusion 
          A new commitment and a sad failure: 
         America’s commitment to prevention 
Chapter four argued that the United States refrained from intervention in Rwanda 
because constituents did not pressure the Clinton administration to act, the Clinton 
administration viewed Rwanda through a schema that deemed intervention futile and because 
American policy was in the process of turning away from intervention.  The long history of 
tensions between Hutu and Tutsi fueled by European misconceptions of their preexisting 
relations facilitated the genocide and gave the appearance that the conflict was an ancient 
affair.  Embedded in the justifications for inaction is a new policy course for the United 
States.  The 1994 genocide forced America to change its approach to injecting American 
military personnel in the middle of conflicts.  This change entailed a move from intervention 
to prevention.  By providing developmental aid to a conflict torn nation, the United States 
could eliminate the problems that caused civil wars.  Prevention required a greater American 
presence in the target countries.   Where the US previously left Rwanda to its own business, 
getting involved in diplomatic affairs only when conflict threatened regional stability, it took 
a stronger hand in Rwanda’s development. 
 American policy shifted from intervention to prevention under Presidents Bush 41 
and Clinton because they believed it better for American interests.  American policy makers 
adopted a new commitment to conflict prevention that required the American private sector 
and international actors to rebuild Rwanda’s economy and solve the refugee problem. The 
United States extended its Rwandan interests to facilitate state building, finding diplomatic 
solutions to the contested repatriation of refugees and to end the conflict between Rwanda 
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and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).  American policy makers believed that 
they could prevent future wars between the Hutu and Tutsi by fostering the creation of a 
stable Rwandan state.  This required the creation of a stable economy and government that 
could prevent the escalation of racial, economic and political conflicts to war.  American 
policy makers argued that a stable state possessed the needed apparatuses to defuse economic 
and political conflicts and prevent the outbreak of an internal war. 
 The Rwandan genocide devastated more than the country’s population.  The 
displacement of hundreds of thousands of people left farms untended and businesses void of 
employees and customers.  Health, food and housing problems existed among those who 
remained in Rwanda.  When the dust cleared and the RPF took control of the government, 
the first order of business was fixing these problems. 
 The United States, along with others in the international community, answered the 
call for assistance.  Rebuilding Rwanda was a way for the US to follow its policy aims of 
conflict prevention and to seek forgiveness for its failure to intervene during the genocide.  
The United States Agency for International Development program (USAID) took the lead in 
aiding Rwanda.  USAID targeted health problems, like the spread of AIDS and malaria, and 
repairing Rwanda’s agricultural industry.224   
The Central Intelligence Agency estimated that “by 2007 150,000 Rwandans were 
infected with AIDS”, or put differently 2.8% of the total population.225  USAID achieved 
great success in combating the spread of AIDS through making HIV and AIDS testing more 
available, educating people to the importance of testing, promoting and providing better birth 
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control usage, and engaging private for-profit and not-for-profit organizations to increase 
testing and the distribution of AIDS medication to the general population. Combining 
government run and NGO operations for testing with private sector operations increased the 
percentage of people tested.  Though the wealthier members of the country utilize the private 
sector for-profit organizations resources more, the presence of non-profit-organizations and 
NGOs offering care and testing increased the distribution of care to low income 
Rwandans.226 
 Combating the spread of AIDS in Rwanda is an American interest because of the 
damage it did to Rwanda’s economy and population.  Given that Rwanda was in a state of 
economic turmoil after the genocide, combating the spread of AIDS helped repair the 
economy by easing the burden on those who care for the sick and preventing a reduction in 
the working population.  Because repairing Rwanda’s economy was at the top of its priorities 
for ensuring continued stability, combating any factor that damaged the economy was a key 
means of assuring the success of the policy objective.  Prior to the genocide, Rwanda’s 
economy was primarily agricultural.  The economy depended on a large labor force that 
cultivated cash crops like coffee, Rwanda’s chief export crop.  The spread of AIDS depleted 
the labor force needed for prosperous cultivation by weakening potential workers and 
drawing others away from the fields to care for the sick.  The best way to prevent this was to 
prevent the uncontrolled spread of AIDS by providing adequate health education and care for 
the sick. 
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Since the genocide, the United States provided millions of dollars in humanitarian 
and developmental aid directly to Rwanda.  In 1995, the US provided $125.9 million dollars 
in humanitarian aid to Rwanda earmarked for developing Rwanda’s healthcare system.227  
This included building hospitals and training medical personnel and providing incentives for 
people to seek medical care.  In 2007, the US increased the direct aid to $140.4 million and 
in 2008 to $152.7 million. President Bush made Rwanda a focus country of the President’s 
Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief to promote greater tracking of AIDS infected people.  
Through better tracking, relief workers can ensure follow up doctor visits for sick individuals 
and increase the effectiveness and frequency of treatment. 228  
Rwanda has been home to the most densely packed population in Africa for several 
decades.  The population density caused problems with the country’s agricultural economy 
over the decades.  The traditional family holdings broke down after the genocide as entire 
towns and villages died or fled the violence.  The family holdings faced problems of over 
cultivation as families initially spread to new lands when their numbers grew too large for 
their land.  This eventually decreased the amount that individual farms produced.  Lower 
crop yields and loss of farming population triggered food shortages throughout the 
country.229 
 The international community combated the growing hunger problem through food 
relief and programs designed to improve the agricultural economy. The Word Food Program 
(WFP) implemented a seed protection program during the planting season to prevent the 
death of crops and preserve seeds for later seasons.  The program limited the amount of seed 
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farmers used while seeding their lands and took measures to protect the seeds planted to 
ensure greater crop yields. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 
distributed essentials for farming like seed, tools and fertilizer to Rwandans throughout 
1995.230  Developing a stronger agricultural economy was essential for Rwanda’s stability 
and development, as it would provide food for the hungry and work for the poor.  In 2010, 
the CIA estimated that 90% of Rwanda’s total population worked in subsistence agriculture 
and that the majority lived below the poverty line.  These individuals earned less than 250 
Rwandan francs (or US $0.43) per day.231  Combating problems in food production, inflation 
and trade deficits was a primary interest for American and international assistance 
organizations like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. 
 The 1994 genocide and changing farming practices caused a great deal of damage to 
Rwanda’s agricultural economy.  The death and displacement of nearly half of Rwanda’s 
population left crops to die in the field.  John May argued that Rwanda’s soil fertility 
weakened over the past twenty years due to the conversion of pastureland to cropland.   The 
decrease in pasture animals caused a decrease in manure and subsequently fertilizer 
production.  Pasture manure had traditionally been a cheap and easily obtainable source of 
fertilizer for farmers.  The loss of this fertilizer caused the loss of soil fertility and an increase 
in imported fertilizers.  Poor farmers could not afford large quantities of imported fertilizers 
leading to the dominance of wealthier farmers and politically connected communes.  May 
further argued that the use of imported fertilizers did not prevent soil degradation but only 
masked it, as their affects were only temporary.232 
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In 2004, the US backed the ADAR project (Assistance á la Dynamisation 
del’Agribusiness au Rwanda).  The project used education and financial assistance to 
encourage entrepreneurs to create new businesses.  President George W. Bush (Bush 43) 
issued $10.5 million in aid to the ADAR program.  The US Agency for International 
Development (USAID) assisted in determining whether the traditional collectives approach 
to farming was the best method for rebuilding the coffee industry or if a system of 
entrepreneurs would be better.  Rwanda’s chief agricultural industry was coffee production, 
which suffered during the late 1980s when international coffee prices dropped.  The 
Partnership to Enhance Agriculture in Rwanda worked through linkages with the American 
backed Project Pearl to reorganize the farming industry to place small, organized groups of 
farmers at the center of the coffee industry.    Project Pearl helped obtain World Bank loans 
for developing farms and to build farmer owned seed washing stations.  Coffee harvests 
needed proper cleaning before sale on the international market.  The new stations allowed 
smaller farmers to avoid exploitation by larger farmers and government supporters who 
controlled the older washing stations and charged impossible fees for their use.233 
 The US backed these organizations to help stimulate Rwanda’s economy.  Countries 
with stable economies were less likely to engage in civil wars because their populations were 
less likely to be angry with their governments.  When people were making money and 
providing for their families, they were less likely to take issue with the government.  When 
their economic reality fell below their expectations, they began to take issue with the 
government.  In countries with a violent past, these issues could escalate into civil violence. 
American policy makers applied this theory to prevention policy in Rwanda.  The more 
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stable they could make the Rwandan economy, the less likely the civil war would restart.  
Economic troubles factored prominently into the 1959 revolution as Hutu leaders targeted the 
disparity in wealth between Tutsi and Hutu, and again during the genocide as MRND 
proponents capitalized on economic troubles caused by the drop in international coffee prices 
to rile the Hutu population against the Tutsi. 
 Other forms of economic assistance came through loan relief.  In 2006, the 
International Monetary Fund and World Bank placed Rwanda on the list of countries eligible 
for the Heavily Indebted Poor Country initiative (HIPC).  The HIPC allowed poor countries a 
measure of debt relief, by granting exemptions on loans and interest payments, if they meet a 
series of criteria.  When a country met the requirements of the two-step relief program, they 
were eligible for interest payment and loan relief.  The purpose of the HIPC initiative was to 
free up money government needed to repay debt for use in other areas.  Once the countries 
freed these funds, they could use them for developing health care facilities and schools 
among other social works.234  
 The Bush 43 administration took measures to facilitate private sector involvement 
and development in Rwanda.  In 2008, President Bush 43 signed a bilateral investment treaty 
(BIT) with President Paul Kagame of Rwanda.  American investors in Rwanda’s 
development received legal protections under the BIT.  Under the BIT, investors were 
assured non-discriminatory treatment, the free transfer of investment funds between the US 
and Rwanda, compensation for funds lost to expropriation and transparency in governance, 
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and the right to bring investment disputes to a neutral, international arbitration panel.235  
These guarantees facilitated foreign investment in Rwanda by offering protection of 
investment funds and means of settling disputes between foreign investors and domestic 
partners.  The BIT protections fostered growth in US-Rwandan trade over the years since the 
genocide.  The BIT facilitated a forty percent increase in trade from 2006 to 2007.  America 
imported $13 million worth of Rwandan imports during the yearly period.236  
Since the genocide, the United States has maintained a commitment to upholding 
human rights legal traditions.  The US did this through cooperation with the UN International 
Tribunal for Rwanda and through hearing cases under the Alien Tort law of 1789.   
Immediately following the genocide, the United Nations moved to establish a 
criminal tribunal to prosecute the perpetrators of the genocide.  UN Resolution 955 
established the International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda. The UN established the tribunal 
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter concerning threats to international peace.237  The 
presence of the tribunal helped prevent international incidents over the contested extradition 
of accused persons.   The tribunal required all UN member states to cooperate with the 
detaining and extradition of defendants to stand trial.  This included detaining and turning 
over those indicted for genocide and crimes against humanity during the 1994 genocide as 
established by the Geneva Convention.238  The Tribunal’s mandate extended its jurisdiction 
over crimes committed by Rwandans and non-Rwandans between January 1, 1994 and 
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December 31, 1994.  It also covered crimes committed by Rwandans in neighboring 
countries.239 
The NGOR initially voted against resolution 955 citing problems with terms of the 
resolution.  The NGOR did not trust the tribunal because of UN failure to help during the 
genocide.  Government officials did not believe the UN was capable of helping Rwanda and 
that Rwanda would have to handle the prosecution of the perpetrators.  The Tribunal’s first 
two years were marred with administrative misshapes.  Funding issues and administrative 
discrepancies hindered The Tribunal’s progress.  From 1996 to 1998, the UN performed a 
series of audits that fixed the funding issues and improved the Tribunal’s performance.240   
The Alien Tort law and Alien Tort Claims Act of 1789 gave US federal courts 
jurisdiction over “any civil action by an alien for tort only, committed in violation of the law 
of nations or a treaty of the United States”.241  Under the law, American courts could hear 
non-criminal abuses from any country so long as the crime violated recognized international 
law.  This meant that American federal courts could hear cases of genocide and crimes 
against humanity because the United States adhered to international laws such as the Geneva 
Convention.  The laws first use was in 1978 by a group of Paraguayans seeking justice for 
the murder of the son of Dr. Joel Filartiga.  The police officer guilty of killing Dr. Filartiga’s 
son escaped justice in Paraguay, but members of Dr. Filartiga’s family filed suit against him 
in New York.  The New York Court of Appeals for the second Circuit heard the case and 
awarded the Filartigas $10 million in damages.  The Filartiga case set the precedent that the 
US would be willing to try non-criminal cases for violations of international laws.  Plaintiffs 
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could bring a case to court regardless of the citizenship of the plaintiff and defendant.   This 
allowed plaintiffs from any country a chance at the justice they were previously denied.  The 
Supreme Court reinforced this by refusing to overturn the Filartiga ruling, making the law a 
favored weapon of human rights groups.242  
In 1994, Human Rights Watch sued Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza in the name of 
Rwandans in the US related to genocide victims.  Judge John Martin of the second District 
Court of New York found Barayagwiza, chair of Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Colliness, 
guilty of assisting in the planning and implantation of the genocide.  Judge Martin ordered 
Barayagwiza to pay $105 million in damages to the plaintiffs.243 Despite the plaintiffs 
receiving little of the money owed to them, the ruling opened the door for other Rwandans to 
bring similar cases to American courts.  Having these cases heard in the United States 
provided new exposure for human rights violations and a new venue for their persecution. 
The courts would only bring cases to trial if the defendant enters American territory.  
American law enforcement and courts would not make a case for extradition because they 
were not criminal cases.  The courts refused to hear cases against heads of state and foreign 
governments respecting their diplomatic immunity. The Clinton Administration resisted 
relaxing rules that would allow for the easy seizure of foreign assets so plaintiffs could 
receive their compensation because it risked American assets abroad.  If the US attempted to 
seize a defendant’s foreign assets, other governments would have a legal precedent set by the 
US to do the same against the US.  However, President Bush 43 leaned in favor of plaintiff 
rights because it granted his administration another diplomatic weapon against countries and 
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individuals supporting terrorists.244  The United States would be able to seize assets used by 
defendants found guilty under the Alien Tort Law.  Taking these assets could weaken 
terrorist groups tied to these defendants. 
In December 1994, the UN passed a resolution that encouraged international, 
intergovernmental, nongovernmental organizations (NGO) and development organizations to 
aid in rebuilding Rwanda.  Rebuilding the economy and infrastructure would increase 
Rwanda’s stability.245  This resolution encouraged the new government of Rwanda (NGOR) 
to create conditions that would encourage refugees to return.  Three million of Rwanda’s 
seven million people fled Rwanda after the RPF took control of the country.246  Between 13 
and 18 July 850,000 refugees crossed the border into Zaire.  The refugees settled in the Kivu 
and Goma regions, but the government of Zaire lacked the needed infrastructure to support 
them and attempted to redirect the refugees to camps established in other regions.247  The UN 
eventually established Goma as the logistical base for humanitarian relief operations set up to 
aid a refugee population reaching into the millions.248  
 These camps proved to be a source of increased regional tensions.  Hutu extremists 
and remnants of the former government of Rwanda (FGOR) hid among the refugees.  French 
Troops operating as part of Operation Turquoise helped members of the FGOR and FAR 
escape to Zaire because they wanted to keep possibilities for future negotiations and a power 
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sharing government open.249 Militia and FAR soldiers and leaders took control of the camps’ 
populations to prevent repatriation of the Hutu refugees and to control the flow of aid goods 
throughout the camps.250 Eventually, the GOR remnants began a guerilla war against the 
FGOR using the refugee camps in Zaire as bases.  Between 17 and 18 April, the NGOR 
closed eight refugee camps in southern Rwanda without prior notification.  FGOR guerillas 
based operations out of these camps, using violence to control the camp populations so they 
could use the refugees as human shields.  The NGOR planned to close the camps and force 
the refugees to return to their homes.  Doing so would deprive FGOR supporters of supplies 
and bases, making it easier for the NGOR to find them.  FGOR hardliners forced refugees to 
stay.251 
 FGOR attacks on Rwandans within their borders led to NGOR retaliations against 
Hutu populations believed to be helping the FGOR troops.  FGOR troops actively trained 
new recruits in the Zairian refugee camps and moved arms shipments between camps to arm 
the new soldiers.  This caused President Kagame to order the borders with Zaire re-secured 
under more strict conditions. The UN Security Council attempted to alleviate tensions by 
reaffirming Council Resolution 918 (1994), which placed an arms embargo on Rwanda and 
Zaire.  Chapter VII of the UN Charter bared countries from supplying arms to a neighboring 
nation that might use them in or sell them to Rwanda. 252   
 Not wanting to contend with the refugee problem, the government of Zaire initiated a 
program of forced repatriation on August 19, 1995.  The government closed five of the 
eleven refugee camps in the Uvira area and forced 14,000 Rwandan and 2,000 Burundian 
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refugees into Rwanda.  Some 84,000 refugees fled into the hills and forests around the camps 
to escape the forced repatriation.  This came in response to the UN easing arms embargos 
against Rwanda for security purposes and clearing minefields left from the civil war.  On 
August 17, Prime Minister of Zaire Étienne Tshisekedi wrote to Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the 
Secretary General of the UN, concerning the refugee situation.  Tshisekedi argued that lifting 
the arms embargos endangered Zaire and further complicated the refugee situation.  He 
informed Boutros-Ghali of his government’s intention to relocate the refugees to other 
countries.  On August 23, the UN Security Council called on Zaire to honor its humanitarian 
obligations and the government of Zaire halted the forced repatriation of refugees the next 
day.253 
 Pressure from the US and UN to resolve the conflict and peacefully repatriate the 
refugees failed.  In 1996, Kigali ordered the Rwandan army to enter Zaire, eliminate the Hutu 
rebels and overthrow President Mobutu Sese Seko for his support of the Hutu rebels.  The 
1996 war ended with Kagame replacing Mobutu with Laurent-Desire Kabila, the leader of 
the Alliance des Forces Démocratiques por la Libération du Congo-Zaïre (AFDL).  Kabila 
took power on May 17, 1997 and renamed Zaire the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(DRC).    The peace did not last as Kabila ordered all foreign troops, who remained in the 
DRC to aid internal security, to leave the country in July 1998.  Rwandan troops violently 
resisted the expulsion in August, but a joint effort by Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia 
stopped them.  The conflict quickly escalated into an international war in central Africa.  
Rwanda claimed control of portions of eastern DRC in 1998, while Uganda claimed northern 
DRC in 1999.   UN, the European Union pressured the combatants to stop fighting by tying 
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the continuation of aid programs to ending the conflict.  Rwanda’s neighbors brought about 
the Lusaka Accords, which attempted to enforce a cease-fire backed by a UN peacekeeping 
mission, but administrative troubles derailed the mission and the implementation of the 
Accords failed.  The fighting ended in 2003 under further international economic and 
diplomatic pressure.254 
 Rwanda and DRC continued to have conflict over rebel operations in eastern DRC 
despite the enforcement of a formal peace agreement.  The continued rebel conflict 
threatened another war between Rwanda and DRC until the UN successfully pressured 
President of Rwanda Paul Kagame into establishing peaceful ties with the government of 
DRC.  In 2009, the DRC and Rwanda agreed to a combined military operation to deal with 
the rebels in eastern Congo.  Some experts have speculated that President Kagame was 
shamed into making this agreement by the public release of a UN report in December 2009 
that Rwanda supported Laurent Nkunda, the rebel leader fighting the DRC government.  This 
report and others that argued the RPF murdered Hutu refugees in Rwanda and DRC cost 
Rwanda millions in foreign aid and diplomatic credibility.  As part of the agreement between 
Rwanda and the DRC, NGOR arrested Nkunda while DRC turned on rebels it had 
supported.255 
 The Rwanda-DRC war marked a failure of American prevention policy because 
despite the efforts to prevent the resurgence of the Hutu-Tutsi conflict the fighting continued.  
The international protection and humanitarian support provided to the refugee camps 
provided the GOR remnants with a new base of operations to launch a guerilla campaign 
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against the NGOR.  The US, through its influence in the UN, attempted to solve the refugee 
problem to prevent the spread of further violence, but Rwandan internal issues prevented 
this.  Racial tensions spurred further violence as Tutsi engaged in reprisal killings and GOR 
remnants attacked RPF holdings.  American and international efforts to rebuild Rwanda in 
the years following the genocide have been successful, but have not been enough to prevent 
further fighting. 
 The prevention policy did not work.  The Hutu rebels operated from bases inside the 
DRC in the same way the RPF did in Uganda in the 1990s.  However, the Hutu rebels did not 
launch a full-scale invasion of Rwanda in the same way their RPF predecessors did.  The 
rebel attacks, failure by the government of the DRC and UN to close the camps finally 
caused the NGOR to attack the camps in eastern-DRC turning the internal conflict, in the 
sense that it is Rwandans fighting Rwandans, into a regional one.   
 The invasion turned into a series of conflicts that escalated into the largest African 
war in history.  Despite the success of the American private sector’s initiatives to rebuild 
Rwanda, the conflict prevention policy behind the initiatives failed.  International efforts 
were eventually able to stop the continued conflict.  Diplomatic and economic pressures 
applied to combatants on all sides eventually inspired the NGOR and government of the 
DRC to work together to solve their mutual problems.   
It is unknown if the current cooperation will continue, but the history of its formation 
leads to questioning the usefulness of American intervention policy.  Yes, increased 
American private sector involvement helped create a stable economy and decreased Hutu-
Tutsi conflict within the country, but it did not create internal or regional stability.  The 
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decrease in conflict is not the cessation of it as seen by the NGOR invasion of first Zaire then 
DRC.  
 The economic and political development facilitated by the international community 
failed to prevent governing issues.  Controversy surrounded the August 9, 2010 Presidential 
election.  Human Rights Watch investigated rumors and accusations of politically charged 
violence in the months leading to the election.  Human Rights Watch has collected reports of 
attacks on journalists, silencing members of opposition parties, prohibiting opposition party 
members to run in the election and even several counts of politically motivated murder. 
 Throughout January and May 2010, police prevented the FDU-Inkingi and the 
Democratic Green Party from holding their annual congress meetings.  Both parties were 
unable to register their candidates for the election because holding these meetings was a 
registration requirement.  Throughout the next several months, police and government 
supporters attacked members of the opposition parties, imprisoned independent journalists, 
shut down periodicals, denied refugees work visas, and drove opposition leaders into exile.256  
 The political violence is reminiscent of Habyarimana’s regime and risks a resurgence 
of ethnic conflict in Rwanda as the RPF is an apparatus of Tutsi domination.  The oppression 
of political parties and independent citizens who criticize the Kagame administration 
supported this comparison as Habyarimana engaged in a great deal of political violence and 
maintained a single party state for the majority of his tenure as president. Human Rights 
Watch specifically targeted the 2008 genocide ideology law as a tool of government 
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suppression of free speech and political dissent.  The law allowed the government to arrest 
any individual for using language that threatened racial violence.  Human Rights Watch 
argued that the government used the law to suppress opposition to the government by 
claiming they were preventing the spread of racially charged speech.  The NGOR detained 
anyone accused of breaking the law.  The allowed the NGOR means to silence and prevent 
the growth of political parties opposed to the Kagame administration.  Any dissent or 
criticism of the government resulted in arrest and imprisonment.257 
 Rwanda holds an intriguing and tragic place in the history of American foreign 
policy.  The refusal to act during the 1994 genocide is one of America’s most lamentable 
policy decisions.  America’s commitment to protecting human rights was shattered when the 
Clinton administration refused to reinforce UNAMIR.  The refusal to act emerged as part of 
the transformation of American intervention policy started by President Bush 41.  The 
genocide presented a situation that called for an immediate decision on the direction of 
American policy.  Clouded by the failure of UNOSOM and a schema that told them 
involvement in any African conflict was a futile effort, President Clinton and his chief policy 
makers decided that the best thing the US could do was to stay away.    
 Rwanda and the US grew closer together as President Bush 41 added it to American 
foreign interests.  President Bush 41 engaged the American private sector in efforts to rebuild 
Rwanda’s economy and government, thereby facilitating the cessation of Hutu-Tutsi 
hostilities.  Sadly, these attempts failed as much as they succeeded.  Rwanda’s economy has 
greatly increased in recent years, but economic reconstruction did not prevent new Hutu-
Tutsi violence.  The NGOR pursued Hutu rebels operating from refugee camps in Zaire.  The 
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Rwandan army invaded Zaire three times over the past twenty years, one of which replaced 
the Zaire government with the DRC and another instigated the largest international war in 
African history.  Accusations of reprisal killings against Hutu populations spread as the 
Rwandan army engaged rebel forces throughout eastern-DRC.  The fighting ceased only after 
the international community utilized economic and diplomatic pressures against Rwanda and 
the DRC. 
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